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I.
INTRODUCTION
Rogers v. EEOC' is widely cited as the first case to recognize a hostile
working environment as a form of illegal employment discrimination in

1. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
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general and of racial harassment in particular.' Since this 1971 landmark
case, however, little systematic assessment of racial harassment case law
has occurred. This Article, and the empirical study on which it is based,
begin to fill this void in scholarship. They offer a window into racial
harassment law and into actual racial harassment practices in the workplace.
Many in American society imagine that racial discrimination and
harassment are no longer prevalent in the workplace. 3 When racial
discrimination or harassment do occur, they are perceived as out of the
ordinary, perhaps perpetrated by an uneducated and unsophisticated boss in
an isolated industry or part of the country where such socially antiquated
behavior is tolerated. A common assumption is that blatant racist insults,
such as using racial epithets or the flaunting of nooses, no longer occurand in the rare instances in which they do, judges and juries certainly would
conclude that they are illegal.
Despite these societal beliefs that the workplace is not racist, evidence
to the contrary is mounting.4 Racial harassment is a particular form of
racism and of harassment which occurs when individuals are intimidated,
insulted, bullied, excessively monitored or otherwise harassed because of

2. While the plaintiff in the Rogers case based her lawsuit on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Rogers case and subsequent cases under Title VII have also been applied to cases under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
3.

See, e.g., JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA:

ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, & FUTURE

REPARATIONS 123-24 (2000) (citing various surveys of White Americans including those on job
discrimination); Adam Goodheart, The New America: A Change of Heart, AARP MAG., May/June
2004, at 43-49, 82 (survey indicating that majority of Whites deny persistent discrimination against
minorities); HOwARD SCHUMAN, CHARLOTrE STEEH, LAWERENCE BOBO & MARIA KRYSAN, RACIAL
ATrITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS 166-67 (1997) (survey showing that three-

quarters of Whites reject the proposition that Blacks face workplace barriers).
4. Research documents all kinds of racial discrimination in the workplace, including racial
harassment. See, e.g., Aaron Bernstein, Racism in the Workplace, BUS. WK., July 30, 2001, at 64-67
(noting patterns of racial harassment in the workplace); ALFRED BLUMROSEN & RUTH BLUMROSEN,
THE NATIONAL REPORT:

THE REALITY OF INTENTIONAL JOB DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN

AMERICA- 1999 (2002), http://www.eeol.com/1999-NR/1999-nr.htm (revealing a widespread pattern
of "intentional" discrimination, which is defined as underutilization of minorities or women at more than
two standard deviations below the standard of utilization within an industry with the inference that such
underutilization cannot be explained by chance or because of a lack of available candidates); CATALYST,
WOMEN

OF

COLOR

IN

CORPORATE

MANAGEMENT:

THREE

YEARS

LATER

(2002),

http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/titles/title.php?page-woc-corpmngt3yrs_ 01 (follow "Download
report" hyperlink) (reporting a decline in opportunities for minority women to reach senior management
roles); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhi Mullainanthan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha
and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. w9873, 2003) (their findings suggesting that either employers are prejudiced or
employers perceive that race signals different productivity levels: (I)job applicants with White names
needed to send about 10 resumes to get one callback, but those with African American names needed to
send around 15 resumes to get one callback; and (2) Whites with higher quality resumes received 30%
more callbacks than Whites with lower quality resumes, but the positive impact of a better resume -for
those with African-American names was much smaller).
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their race.' Racial harassment occurs in a range of settings, including the
workplace.6 This research study notably reveals a more complex and
sometimes dramatically different picture of the workplace than American
society imagines. This empirical research tests our assumptions about the
law and social paradigm in which we frame and interpret racial
harassment.7
5.

Employees of course can be harassed and treated in an uncivil manner on the basis of

attributes other than race.
WORKPLACE BULLYING:

See, e.g., CHARLOTTE RAYNER, HELGE HOEL & CARY L. COOPER,

WHAT WE KNOW, WHO Is TO BLAME, AND WHAT CAN WE Do? (2002);

David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of "'WorkplaceBullying" and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile
Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475 (2002); GIOVINELLA GONTHIER, RUDE AWAKENINGS:
OVERCOMING THE CIVILITY CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE (2002); SETH ALLCORN, ANGER IN THE
WORKPLACE:

UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSES OF AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE (1994).

Harassment also

occurs in settings other than work. See ROBIN M. KOWALSKI, COMPLAINING, TEASING, AND OTHER
ANNOYING BEHAVIORS (2003). As an illustration of the occurrence of racial harassment in a non-work
setting, consider Michael A. Olivas, The PoliticalEconomy of Immigration, Intellectual Property, and
Racial Harassment: Case Studies of the Implementation of Legal Changes on Campus, 63 J. HIGHER
EDUC. 570-98 (1992) (describing racial harassment of students on college campuses).
6. As examples of social science research and discussions on racial harassment in the workplace,
see Edward J. Harrick & George M. Sullivan, Racial Harassment: Case Characteristicsand Employer
Responsibilities, 8 EMP. RESP. AND RTS. J. 81 (1995); Kimberly T. Schneider et al., An Examination of
the Nature and Correlates of Ethnic Harassment Experiences in Multiple Contexts, 85 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 3 (2000); FEAGIN, supra note 3, at 164-66; and Sunner Shin & Brian H. Kleiner, The
Psychological Effects of Working in a Racially Hostile Environment, 21 INT'L J. SOC. & SOC. POL'Y 59
(2001).
7. Unlike traditional legal analysis where authors build their arguments with a few carefully
selected and persuasive leading cases, this empirical study follows a different process and serves a
different purpose. It methodically studies hundreds of randomly-selected representative judicial
opinions and then draws reasoned inferences from a statistical analysis of these cases. The purpose is to
provide a carefully documented survey and analysis of the facts, issues, and holdings of racial
harassment cases. Rather than reviewing the facts, legal principles, and judicial reasoning with an
advocacy position in mind, this study analyzed each case and gathered information on each variable as
objectively, validly, and reliably as possible. Empirical research thus tests our assumptions about the
law and the social paradigm in which we frame and interpret the legal principles.
Basing an empirical study on published opinions also has certain limitations. Some
individuals believe they are racially harassed but do not file formal complaints nor do they bring
lawsuits. Even disputes involving employees who do file formal charges with the EEOC and then
ultimately engage in litigation are not all captured in these reported cases. Hence, while this study of
cases provides valuable insights into racial harassment litigation and racial harassment in the
workplace-it remains a proxy.
Traditional legal scholarship of course is subject to these same caveats since it also focuses on
published opinions written by judges. This empirical study offers some advantages over traditional legal
scholarship. In describing their empirical study of sexual harassment cases, Professors Juliano and
Schwab explain: "In broadening the traditional analytical legal approach, we have foregone the ability
to examine the nuances of particular cases and doctrinal debates among judges. However, we have
gained perspective on the bulk of the issues and fact patterns with which federal judges wrestle ...This
sweep of cases, then, presents a particularly important perspective." Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab,
The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 553-54 (2001). Itis purposefully a
more representative depiction of racial harassment cases than the traditional approach of citing and
analyzing only a handful of "leading" cases that are purposefully selected to support a particular legal or
policy proposition.
For examples of empirical research in employment law, see id.; Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart
J. Schwab, How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
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Part I of this article offers an overview of racial harassment law and
research, noting its common origin with and its close dependence upon
sexual harassment jurisprudence. Attributable in part to this dependence,
development of racial harassment jurisprudence has been limited.
Part II discusses the findings of the empirical study that is the focus of
this article. An interdisciplinary team of legal, social science, and business
researchers designed and implemented the methodology for this study. We
started by identifying all reported federal district court and appellate judicial
opinions where the plaintiffs brought racial harassment claims under the
major federal statutes for harassment claims in the workplace in six federal
judicial circuits through 2002 ("the racial harassment cases").8 These
circuits represent different geographical regions and include large states
with ethnically diverse populations. Through this method, we identified
625 cases. (An estimate of all reported federal cases on racial harassment
would be 1250 cases.9) A social science "rule of thumb" would recommend
STUD. 429 (2004) [hereinafter Clermont & Schwab]; Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg, &
Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment-DiscriminationPlaintiffs Fare in the FederalCourts of Appeals, 7
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 547 (2003); BLUMROSEN & BLUMROSEN, supra note 4; Vicki Shultz &

Stephen Peterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An EmpiricalStudy of the Lack of Interest Defense
in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073 (1992); David Benjamin
Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and
Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 511 (2003); Kathryn Moss, Scott Burns, Michael Ullman, Matthew Johnsen & Jeffrey
Swanson, Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Study of the Implementation of the American with
DisabilitiesAct by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 50 KAN. L. REV. 1 (2001).
For an excellent resource that explains empirical research and methodology, including its
possible application and prior misapplication to legal topics, see Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of
Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. I (2002). See also Lee Epstein & Gary King, Building an Infrastructure
for Empirical Research in the Law, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (2003); Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple
Regression in Analysis, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702 (1980); MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 71-202

(Rebecca M. Blank, Marilyn Dabady & Constance F. Citro eds., 2004).
8. This study analyzes published judicial opinions. While a particular legal dispute could have
multiple judicial proceedings and judicial opinions, the disputes in this study typically only had a single
judicial proceeding and judicial opinion. Thus, the authors opted to use the more conventional term of
"cases" throughout this article although the study technically studies judicial opinions. See also Juliano
& Schwab, supra note 7 (also using the term "case" to describe judicial opinions).
The search terms were "(rac! w/3 haras!) & ((title vii) or (42 w/5 1981 or 1983)" in the
LEXIS/NEXIS and WESTLAW data bases for all cases in the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh federal circuits through 2002. This search resulted in reported cases brought in these federal
circuits at either the district courts or the appellate courts with racial harassment claims based on Title
VII or Sections 1981 or 1983. While we subsequently discuss the case characteristics in detail, a brief
summary here is helpful. Approximately 80% of the cases in the study are district court cases; 20% are
appellate court cases. Of the district court cases, about 96% are either motions for summary judgments,
motions for dismissals, or bench trial on the merits. The appellate court cases are reviews of district
court motions for summary judgment, bench trials, or jury trials. Many of the cases included other
claims. For example, 13.5% of these racial harassment cases also include a sexual harassment claim.
Judicial opinions dealing with claims of racial harassment based only on state law analogs to Title VII or
dealing with Title VII claims pursued only in state courts are not included in this study.
9. The number of federal racial harassment cases in the six federal circuits in this study is 625
cases. Since there are twelve federal circuits (excluding the Federal Court of Appeals), an estimate of
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a sampling of at least 10-15% of these cases. We exceeded this
recommended percentage by drawing 260 cases, representing 40% of all
cases, in a stratified random sampling within each circuit. The first case in
our study occurred in 1976. Thus, the study covers cases spanning 26
years. "0

Part II offers an analysis of racial harassment laws based on a detailed
examination of the cases in this empirical study. I I It begins by describing
the individuals and companies involved-both those who claim they were
harassed and those they accused of harassing them-thus personalizing the
characters and settings in which harassment occurs. 12 Part II continues with
an exploration of the acts of harassment. It describes how alleged harassers
use words, conduct, and their decision-making authority to create a hostile
working environment. 3
The discussion then focuses on myriad
characteristics of the litigation process itself:
the forum, type of
proceedings, plaintiffs' claims, and legal issues. 4
Part III moves the empirical analysis a further step by focusing on the
outcome of the proceedings in these cases. It offers grim news for
prospective plaintiffs and heartening news for defendants. Plaintiffs are
successful in only 21.5% of the cases analyzed in this study. 5 In this
section, we consider how the different characteristics of racial harassment
cases affect the outcome of the cases. 6 Many interesting patterns appear.
In addition, our study indicates that plaintiffs in racial harassment cases are
more likely than plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases to fare poorly. 7

the number of cases in all circuits would be 1,250 cases (assuming the remaining six circuits are
comparable to those in this study).
10. For the five years after the Rogers case in 197 1, supra note 1, there apparently were few if any
other racial harassment cases.
1t. Each of the 260 cases in this study was independently read and analyzed by at least two
individuals, Professor Chew and one or more student research assistants. We coded the information onto
a case profile form that carefully collected over 100 discrete pieces of information for each case, using
detailed coding instructions. Professor Chew or a graduate student in statistics and economics then
inputted the information onto an Excel spreadsheet. The statistical packages SPSS and EXCEL were
used for performing the various statistical analyses, including were appropriate frequencies, percentages,
averages, correlations, and regressions. In addition, qualitative observations of the court's analysis were
compiled. The statistical analysis was supervised by Professor Kelley in consultation with Professor
Chew.
12. See infra discussion accompanying notes 63-80.
13. See infra discussion accompanying notes 81-90.
14. See infra discussion accompanying notes 9 1-122.
15. See infra discussion accompanying notes 123-26.
16. See infra discussion accompanying notes 127-54.
17. In sexual harassment cases, plaintiffs win in 48.2% of the cases (51.2% of the district court
cases and 39% of the appellate court cases). Juliano & Schwab, supra note 7, at 596. In contrast,
plaintiffs in racial harassment cases win in only 21.5% of the cases (20.8% of the district court cases and
24.5% of the appellate court cases). Hence, plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases are more than twice as
likely to win their case as plaintiffs in racial harassment cases.
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The extensive empirical study described in this article provides rich
data on racial harassment case law and breaks new ground. Prior to this
study, employees, employers, judges, lawyers, and academics could only
speculate on the characteristics and outcomes of racial harassment cases.
Part IV offers an integrated analysis and discussion of the study results by
highlighting key findings relevant to an emerging racial harassment
jurisprudence. 8
A.

Rogers as the Beginning of the HarassmentDoctrine

In the 1971 case Rogers v. EEOC,19 Josephine Chavez charged that her
employer, optometrists S.J. and N. Jay Rogers, segregated their patients as
evidenced by their color-coding customers' office forms by race-using red
ink for Black customers and blue ink for non-Black customers. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) offered the court the thennovel theory that the segregation of patients, "though not directed against
Mrs. Chavez, could 'create an atmosphere that would adversely affect the
terms and conditions of her employment' and thus have an effect that is
proscribed by Title VII."20
Writing the majority opinion, Judge Goldberg embraced the EEOC's
theory, noting that Congress intended Title VII to be liberally and flexibly
interpreted to achieve its anti-discriminatory purposes:
I regard this broad-gauged innovative legislation as a charter of principles
which are to be elucidated and explicated by experience, time, and
expertise. Therefore, it is my belief that employees' psychological as well
as economic fringes are statutorily entitled to protection from employer
abuse, and that the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"
in [Title VII] is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective
ambit the practice of creating a2 working environment heavily charged with
ethnic or racial discrimination. '
Although never using the terms "harassment" or "hostile
environment," Judge Goldberg began to delineate the scope of racial
harassment jurisprudence. He articulated language that has been frequently
cited in subsequent cases:

18. See infra discussion accompanying notes 155-75.
19. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
20. Rogers v. EEOC, 316 F. Supp. 422, 425 (E.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
21. 454 F.2d at 238. Rogers argued that the charge alleged discrimination against the employers'
patients but not toward any employees and that therefore, Mrs. Chavez could not personally claim
discriminatory treatment. Judge Goldberg rejected Rogers' argument. Noting support from the then
recent Supreme Court case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), Judge Goldberg explained
that Title VII is also aimed at consequences and effects of an employment practice even in the absence
of evidence of discriminatory motivation. Id.
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One can readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with
discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological
stability of minority group workers, and I think... Title VII was aimed at
the eradication of such noxious practices.22

B.

Limited Development of RacialHarassmentJurisprudence

The Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 23 describes

Rogers as "apparently the first case to recognize a cause of action based
upon a discriminatory work environment."
Though the doctrine of
discriminatory harassment originated with this landmark racial harassment
case in 1971, the development of key legal constructs and jurisprudence in

discriminatory harassment subsequently focused on sexual harassment.
Beginning with the pioneering work of Catherine MacKinnon in her
1979 book, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex
Discrimination,4 the conceptual debates and evolving models of

harassment jurisprudence have been set in the context of sexual
harassment. 2 For instance, important work by Katherine Franke, Kathryn
Abrams, Anita Bernstein, Vicki Shultz, Martha Chamallas, Theresa Beiner
and others, all discussing sexual harassment, subsequently received

Id.
23. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). The Meritor court cited the Rogers case with approval, although it
erroneously described the facts as a Hispanic complainant charging that her employer created an
offensive work environment for employees by giving discriminatory service to its "Hispanic" clientele.
The correct facts involved an Hispanic employee plaintiff and the optometrists' Black clientele. It is
unclear how to explain this inadvertent but interesting factual error. Was it merely an error in
transcription or, in the alternative, was it a "Freudian slip" because the judges found it too
unconventional or dissonant that one minority group might be personally distressed over the treatment of
another minority group?
22.

24.

CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN:

A CASE OF SEX

DISCRIMINATION (1979). MacKinnon's work, along with pioneering cases such as Williams v. Saxbe,
413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976) and Barnes v. Castle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977), began to crack the
judicial consciousness that sexual harassment of women at work is illegal sexual discrimination.
MacKinnon's work brought attention to long-time abuses of women in all kinds of jobs and industries
and linked them to legal remedies. She envisioned sexual harassment as a male supervisor or coworker
using sexual demands or sex-linked conduct to victimize a female employee. She also articulated two
major forms of sexual harassment: (1) quid pro quo harassment defined by the more or less explicit
exchange of a woman's forced sexual compliance for an employment benefit, and (2) condition of work
harassment in which sex-linked conduct makes the work environment unbearable. MACKINNON, supra,
at 32-46.
25. A review of major legal casebooks on employment discrimination, for instance, indicates that
casebook authors use sexual harassment cases and discussion almost exclusively to explain harassment
jurisprudence under Title VII.

See, e.g., SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES AND

MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 365-97 (2000); ROBERT
BELTON,

DIANNE

AVERY,

DISCRIMINATION LAW:

MARIA

L.

ONTIVEROS

&

ROBERTO

L.

CORRADA,

EMPLOYMENT

CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 440-540 (7th ed.

2004) (but recently expanding coverage to include 10 pages on racial harassment cases out of 100 pages
on harassment jurisprudence generally).
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scholarly recognition.2 This research was in part prompted by five major
Supreme Court cases in harassment law, again all dealing with sexual

harassment fact patterns. These scholars analyzed and often criticized the
Supreme Court's and other courts' theoretical grounding of sexual
27
harassment claims. This quintet of cases-Meritor, Harris,
Oncale,28
2
Burlington and Faragherg-have been integral to the emerging legal

framework for discriminatory harassment.
Despite the origin of these legal principles in sexual harassment fact
patterns, the courts and the EEOC presumptively assume that they apply to
racial harassment. 3" Justice Ginsburg, in a concurring opinion in Harris,
explicitly analogized the legal standards for sexual and racial harassment.3'
The prominence of the Harris case in racial harassment jurisprudence,
moreover, is substantiated by its omnipresent citing in racial harassment
cases.

32

Social science and empirical research on harassment in the workplace
also have focused more on sexual harassment than on racial harassment. 3
In part, the comparative lack of research on racial harassment is attributable
to our still emerging understanding of what racial harassment is. For
instance, previous research has not clearly differentiated between racial
harassment and racial discrimination, so the causes, characteristics and
consequences of the two are confounded. 3 4 Likewise, the differences
26. See Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691
(1997); Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169
(1998); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, Ill HARV. L. REV. 445 (1997);
Vicki Shultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J.1683 (1998); Teresa M. Beiner, Let
the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What Judges and Reasonable People Believe is Sexually Harassing,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791 (2002). See also Martha Chamallas, Writing About Sexual Harassment: A
Guide to the Literature,4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J.
37 (1993) (describing waves of research).
27. Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17(1993).
28.

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs, 523 U.S. 75 (1998).

29. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775 (1998).
30. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH)
3116, at 3246-48 (2002); see. e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 n.1
(2003) (providing that legal principles originating in sexual harassment cases apply to other types of
harassment cases, including harassment based on race, color, religion, or national origin).
31. 510U.S.at24.
32. Ina Westlaw search of most cited cases in racial harassment caselaw on Sept. 24, 2004 (search
of West Key "Civil Rights (78k1 147) Hostile environment" with addition of "race or racially or
racial"), the Harris case was cited 1,000 times, while the Rogers case was cited only 164 times.
33. JSTOR (available at http://www.jstor.org.com)
text ofjournals in a wide range of social science subjects.
JSTOR on Sept. 24, 2004 (search of West Key "Civil
addition of "race or racially or racial"), produced 121
"sexual harassment" produced 1,037 matches.

is an electronic database that contains the full
A search for articles on "racial harassment" in
Rights (78kl 147) Hostile environment" with
matches; in contrast, a search for articles on

34. See, e.g., Schneider et al., supra note 6, at 3-12. Schneider and her coauthors note that social
science research has not clearly distinguished between fundamental concepts such as racial/ethnic
discrimination versus racial/ethnic harassment, or between racial/ethnic harassment versus sexual
harassment. Attempting to add some clarity, they define racial/ethnic discrimination and racial/ethnic
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between racial harassment and other types of harassment, such as sexual
harassment, as well as the intersection between racial harassment and other
types of harassment, are just beginning to be recognized and understood. 5
Explanations of racial harassment are further complicated because
there are different forms of racial harassment, including verbal racial
harassment, physical forms of harassment directed at a racial group, and
exclusion from work-related or social interactions because of one's race.36
This treatment can be blatantly racist, where the harasser manifests overt
hostility and animosity toward those of other races.
In the alternative,
racism can take other forms that are more subtle, indirect, and covert.38
These latter forms of racism, sometimes called "aversive racism," can also
be unconscious and unintentional. Linda Hamilton Krieger, for instance,
points to a number of cognitive processes that are unintentional but
nevertheless result in biased employment decisions and conduct.39 In
addition, aversive racism has substantial negative effects on the
performance of both the targeted individuals and their work groups.4"
We also are in the early stages of sorting out the perceptions of
different racial groups with respect to racial harassment. Social science

harassment in the following ways. Racial/ethnic discrimination is defined as unequal treatment because
of one's race or ethnicity, and is conceptualized as a structural or institutional variable. Racial/ethnic
harassment in the workplace has two parts: (i) slurs or derogatory comments about a target's group, and
(ii) exclusion of the target from work-related or social interactions as a result of the target's ethnicity or
race.

Legal scholars also have not sorted out all the differences between racial discrimination and
racial harassment. For instance, Martha Chamallas, Title Vi's Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive
Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 309 n.8 (2004), identifies four basic frameworks of Title VII
liability: individual disparate treatment, systemic disparate treatment, disparate impact, and harassment.
Harassment, she argues, has sufficiently distinctive elements to classify it separately, although the courts
technically regard it as a variation of individual disparate treatment.
35. See infra note 46.
36. See Schneider et al., supra note 6.
37. See, e.g., FEAGIN, supra note 3.
38. A great deal of research and commentary on the topic of subtle discrimination exists. See,
e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161
(1995) [hereinafter Krieger, Content of Our Categories]; Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Intuitive
Psychologist Behind the Bench: Models of Gender Bias in Social Psychology and Employment
Discrimination Law, 60 J. Soc. ISSUES 835 (2004); Tristan K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace
Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of DisparateTreatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
91 (2003); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000);
Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation, and the Promise of Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 529 (2003); Ann C. McGinley, i Viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing UnconsciousMotive in
Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 421-33 (2003); John Dovidio, On the Nature of
Contemporary Prejudice: The Third Wave, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 829-49 (2001); Lu-in Wang, Race as
Proxy: SituationalRacism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1013, 1022-35 (2003).
39. See Krieger, Content of Our Categories,supra note 38.
40. See Green, supra note 38; Carbado & Gulati, supra note 38.
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research indicates that racial groups perceive differently whether their
organizational environment is racist. "l In particular, it shows that ethnic
minorities are more likely than Whites to conclude that minorities have
been treated unfairly.42 Perhaps these differences in perception are largely
attributable to minorities recognizing aversive racism and Whites not
recognizing it.
Thus, while racial harassment is pervasive and racial harassment
litigation is prevalent, comparatively little scholarship on racial harassment
jurisprudence has surfaced.4 3 Considerable academic discourse exists on
the varied ways to conceptualize sexual harassment and sexual harassment
jurisprudence, yet not one major legal article exists to conceptualize racial
harassment as a unique social phenomenon and harm deserving its own
jurisprudential framework.
Law review articles on racial harassment instead tend to be narrower in
focus, emphasizing a particular case, work context, or jurisdiction."
Alternatively, scholarship has focused on how racial harassment can be
analogized to or considered part of the discourse on sexual harassment and
sexual harassment laws.45 Admirable work by Camille Hebert and Tanya
41.
A range of social science research indicates that Americans of different racial backgrounds
perceive the workplace differently. See, e.g., K.A. DIXON ET AL., A WORKPLACE DIVIDED: How
AMERICANS

VIEW

DISCRIMINATION

AND

RACE

ON

THE

JOB

1

(2002),

http://www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/Resources/Publicationl9/WorkTrends-020107.pdf (joint project with
Center for Survey Research and Analysis, University of Connecticut and John J. Heldrich Center).
Based on a survey of 1,005 workers, the researchers concluded that race is the most significant
determinate in how people perceive and experience discrimination in the workplace, more so than
income and education. White workers are far more likely than minority workers to believe that
everyone is treated fairly at work. For instance, half of African-American workers believe that African
Americans are treated unfairly and 22% of Hispanic-Americans believe that Hispanic-American workers
are treated unfairly, compared to 10% of white workers. Id. at 1, 8.
Also see generally RACIAL ATTITUDES IN THE 1990S (Steven A. Tuch & Jack K. Martin eds.,
1997); HOWARD

SCHUMAN,

CHARLOTTE

STEEH,

LAWRENCE

BOBO

&

MARIA

KRYSAN,

RACIAL

ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS 250-78 (1997); Christopher P. Parker, Boris
B. Baltes & Neil D. Christiansen, Support for Affirmative Action, Justice Perceptions, and Work
Attitudes: A Study of Gender and Racial-Ethnic Group Differences, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 376
(1997); FEAGIN, supra note 3, at 126-28.
42.

See DIXON ETAL., supra note 41.
43. A literature search on Sept. 24, 2004 of all U.S. law reviews and journals for the term "racial
harassment" at least 10 times in the article on LEXIS/NEXIS resulted in 57 items. In contrast, an
identical search for the term "sexual harassment" resulted in 1,640 items.
44. See, e.g., Robert J. Gregory, You Can Call Me "Bitch " Just Don't Use the "N-word ": Some
Thought on Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations and Rodgers v. Western Southern
Life Insurance Co., 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 741 (1997); Phoebe Weaver Williams, Performing in a Racially
Hostile Environment, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 287 (1996); Carol MacKenzie, The Second Circuit Review1985-1986 Term: ConstitutionalLaw: Jailhouse Rocked: The Second Circuit Confronts a Racially
Hostile Work Environment in a CorrectionalFacility: Snell v. Suffolk County, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 357
(1987).
45. See, e.g., L. Camille Hebert, Analogizing Race and Sex in Workplace Harassment Claims, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 819 (1997); Tanya Kateri Hemindez, Sexual Harassment and Racial Disparity: The
Mutual Construction of Gender and Race, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 183 (2001); Tanya Kateri
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Kateri Hemdndez exemplify this. Professor Hebert confirms that courts
routinely analogize sexual harassment laws and racial harassment laws to
each other.46 While this analogizing helps to legitimize sexual harassment,
it may obscure the differences between race-based and sex-based claims.4 7
Furthermore, she notes that the importation of overly strict standards for
sexual harassment into the law of racial harassment may adversely affect
legitimate racial harassment claims.48 Professor Hemdndez particularly
considers issues that arise when we consider the intersection of race and sex
in the harassment context. In one provocative piece, she queries why
women of color are over-represented among those who file sexual
harassment charges with the EEOC. She suggests that minority women are
disproportionately targeted not just for sexual harassment, but also as
targets of a combined, cumulative harassment that is based both on race and
sex in ways that are intersectional and not just additive.49
While building on "what we know" about sexual harassment is a useful
place to begin, this diverts our attention from the inquiry into whether a
novel legal or social perspective on racial harassment that is not linked in
any way to sexual harassment is necessary. Although some parallel issues
exist, other issues seem more apropos to one or the other form of
harassment."
Despite the important and impressive work on sexual
harassment laws, it cannot substitute for work on racial harassment laws. 1

Hemindez, Gender, Race, and Sexuality: Historical Themes and Emerging Issues in Women's Rights
Law: The Next Challenge in Sexual HarassmentReform: Racial Disparity, 23 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.

227 (2002); Virginia W. Wei, Note, Asian Women and Employment Discrimination: Using
IntersectionalityTheory to Address Title VII Claims Based on Combined Factorsof Race, Gender, and
National Origin,37 B.C. L. REV. 771 (1996).
For examples of social science research where both racial and sexual harassment are
considered, see Audrey J. Murrell, Sexual Harassment and Women of Color: Issues, Challenges, and
Future Direction, in

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

IN THE WORKPLACE:

PERSPECTIVES, FRONTIERS, AND

RESPONSE STRATEGIES 51 (Margaret S. Stockdale ed., 1996); and Nicole T. Buchanan & Alayne J.
Ormerod, RacializedSexual Harassment in the Lives of African American Women, in VIOLENCE IN THE
LIVES OF BLACK WOMEN: BATTERED BLACK AND BLUE 107 (Carolyn M. West ed., 2002).
46.

Hebert, supra note 45, at 821-36.

47.

Id. at 836-48.

48. Id. at 878-82.
49. Hemindez, supra note 45, at 183. Furthermore, many minority women are in the lowest
playing jobs with little prospect for advancement (for instance, in agricultural, domestic services, and
low-level assembly) and thus particularly vulnerable to harassment by their supervisors.
50. As an example, the plaintiff's demonstration that the harassment was "unwelcome" has
The requirement has opened the door to
become a critical issue in sexual harassment cases.
controversial scrutiny of the plaintiff's conduct (her dress, joking, flirting, and past behavior). In
contrast, in racial harassment cases, the plaintiffs "unwelcomeness" of racial harassment is rarely an
issue. On the other hand, the requirement that the harassment is "because of sex" is infrequently an
obstacle in heterosexual sexual harassment cases. In contrast, whether the harassment is "because of
race" is a frequent issue in racial harassment cases. See infra discussion accompanying notes 110-12.
The comparative emphasis on "quid pro quo" harassment offers another example. We can more readily
imagine a supervisor coercing a women employee into unwanted sexual activity with the threat of being
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II.
CHARACTERISTICS OF RACIAL HARASSMENT CASES

A.

Dispute Resolution Processfor Racial Harassment Claims

By the time racial harassment cases come before a federal district court
or appellate court, the aggrieved employee, accused employer, and accused
harasser have already been part of a complex dispute resolution process.
We can graphically depict the process as a funnel, where you begin with a
very large number of racial harassment incidents (or at least employees'
perceptions of such) at the wide end of the funnel.52 (See Figure 1.)
Figure 1
Dispute Resolution Process for Racial Harassment Complaints

RackilProccss

Ongohng Posslbility of Settling Dispute

10

Every published case thus begins with an employee believing he or she

was racially harassed. 3 If an aggrieved employee decides to take some

fired than a supervisor coercing a Black woman into accepting racial debasement with the threat of
being fired. See infra note 54.
51. There is the same need for the discrete exploration of other forms of harassment, such as
harassment on the basis of age, religion, or disability that may have been inadvertently overshadowed by
the dominance of research on sexual harassment. Assuming that other forms of harassment, such as
racial harassment, are indistinguishable from sexual harassment threatens to obscure and belittle the
importance of these other forms of harassment and discrimination. At the same time, sexual harassment
and sexual harassment jurisprudence continue to be important and evolving areas for legal and social
science research.
52. The general dispute resolution process has been described in various ways. See, e.g., William
L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming....
15 LAW & SOc'y REV. 631, 635-36 (198l); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation,
31 UCLA L. REv. 72, 86-87 (1993).
53. Even before this point, the employee must overcome social-psychological forces that
discourage people (women and persons of color especially) from acknowledging to themselves that they
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action, a likely next step is to explore grievance procedures within the
organization. If the dispute is not resolved within the company, the
employee may consider pursuing litigation on the basis of Title VII or other
statutes. 4 Before filing a private lawsuit based on Title VII, however, the
employee must first go through administrative procedures administered by
the EEOC.5 5 This includes strict time limits within which the individual
must file charges with the EEOC.5 6 This charge triggers a number of EEOC
procedures, including notice to the employer, an investigation of the facts,
and efforts to settle the charge.57 After these administrative procedures,
many employees do not proceed further even if the dispute has not been
resolved. They may have exhausted their financial or emotional resources,
reassessed their legal claim and determined it is not sufficiently viable, or
simply wanted to move on to other priorities in their lives. Some do move
ahead with private litigation.
As employees move through the various stages of the dispute
resolution process, the number of cases declines.58 Ultimately, only a small

have experienced discrimination. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 25-42
(2005) (summarizing social science research on employees' reluctance to acknowledge and report
discrimination).
54. Theoretically, there are two varieties of racial harassment prohibited by Title VII: quid pro
quo harassment and hostile environment harassment. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 n.I (2003). Quid pro quo
harassment requires that plaintiffs show "tangible job benefits [such as job promotions, raises, favorable
reviews, or continued employment] are conditioned on an employee's submission to conduct of a
[racial] nature and that adverse job consequences result from the employee's refusal to submit to the
conduct." Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1414 (10th Cir. 1987). Thus, if a supervisor
communicates directly or indirectly to an employee "If you don't let me ridicule you with racial epithets
and stereotypes, you won't get that promotion," this would appear to constitute the kind of improper
racial bargaining described above. However, there were no cases in the study where plaintiffs brought a
claim of quid pro quo racial harassment. Plaintiffs and their lawyers have apparently bought into the
assumption that a claim of quid pro quo racial harassment is not possible, even though it would appear
that such a claim is conceptually and realistically plausible.
55. Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1 104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1992). This allows the EEOC to
investigate the claim and provides the employer notice of the complaint and the opportunity to settle the
dispute through conference, conciliation, or persuasion. Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination
Questions and Answers, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html (last modifed May 24, 2002). See
generally EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) (2005); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.6 to 1601.29 Subpart B-Procedures
for the Prevention of Unlawful Employment Practices (2003).
56. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (2003).
57. As an alternative to a lengthy investigation process, the parties may be selected for the
EEOC's expanding mediation program. EEOC mediation is voluntary and confidential. If the
mediation is not successful, the dispute returns to the EEOC process. For the EEOC website describing
the mediation program, see http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/. See E. PATRICK MCDERMOTT ET AL., AN
EVALUATION OF THE EEOC MEDIATION PROGRAM (2000), http://eeoc.gov/mediate/report.

58. As Professor Pether reveals, federal judges determine (often on the basis of ad hoc criteria)
which of their opinions are released to publishers (i.e., West and LEXIS) and these publishers then edit
out (on the basis of various policies) opinions for the Federal Reporter system and for posting on their
websites. Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of PrivateJudging in the U.S. Courts,
56 STAN. L. REV. 1435 1465-74 (2004). See also Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the
Icebergfrom Its Tip: A Comparison of Publishedand Unpublished Employment DiscriminationCases,
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percentage of the original incidents are litigated and an even smaller
number are then reported in opinions. 9 To illustrate, over 56,000 racial
6
harassment charges were filed with the EEOC between 1980 and 1999. 0
Our study estimates 735 judicial opinions on racial harassment during
approximately that same time period, which amounts to only 1.3% of the
charges.61 Since not all individuals who believe they have been harassed
bring an EEOC charge, the percentage of those who believe they have been
harassed and ultimately have their case published is even smaller.
B.
1.

The Partiesand Setting

Plaintiffs' Profile

To learn more about the individuals who bring racial harassment
claims, this study gathers various information on the plaintiffs: their
gender, race, ethnicity, and a description of their employment. The
percentages given throughout Part II are based on the total number of cases
in which the particular information is available. For some variables, the
information is not available in all 260 cases. The actual number of cases
("N") represented by the percentage is given in the accompanying tables so
that the reader can consider the sample size for that variable.62
(a) Gender and Race. As shown in Table 1, the plaintiffs in racial
harassment cases are more likely to be men (58.5%) than women (41.5%).63
This gender distribution approximates the percentages of men and women
in the general labor force.'
24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1133, 1144-45 (1990) (finding that 80-90% of employment discrimination cases
filed in federal court do not produce a published opinion).
59. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(And Think We Know) about Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4,
26-27 (1983) (indicating that the settlement rate for cases is very high). In addition, some employees
may pursue their racial harassment claims only in state courts under state or federal laws.
60. Trends in Harassment Charges Filed with the EEOC During the 1980s and 1990s,
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harassment.html (last modified July 22, 2004).
61. This study included 147 cases during this period. Given that this represents 40% of six federal
circuits, an estimate ofjudicial opinions in all circuits in this period would be 735. In addition, some of
those who filed charges during this period may still be awaiting a judicial resolution.
62. The plaintiffs' gender is identifiable in all 260 cases. Thus, in Table 1, women are plaintiffs in
108 cases, which constitute 41.5% of all the cases in which the gender of the plaintiff is available. The
plaintiffs' race or ethnicity, however, is indicated in only 234 cases. Thus, in Table 1, African
Americans are plaintiffs in 191 cases, which constitute 81.6% of these 234 cases.
63. In coding gender, the study uses the gender designation indicated in the judicial opinion,
although the coauthors recognize that the objective determination of "gender" and "sex" is contestable.
64. The gender and racial percentages for both the general population and the general labor force
are calculated on the basis of the latest available census data. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 2002: THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK, 16
(Table 14), 368 (Table 562) (122nd ed. 2002) [hereinafter CENSUS BUREAU]. The percentages for the
general population and the labor force are fairly comparable. (E.g., African Americans constitute
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Table ]. Plaintiffs' Gender and Race
As %of All

Cases

(N)

As %of Labor Force in

eneral

Gender:
Worrin
Men
Race or Ethnici
African Atrican
Asian A-erican
Hispanic Arrerican
Native Arnerican
White Armerican

41.5
58.5

(108)
(152)

46.6
53.4

81.6
4.7
4.7

(191)
(11)
(11l)

11.9
3.9
13.4

.4
8.6

(1)
(20)

.9
70.0

The ethnic and racial diversity 65 of plaintiffs is notable in various ways
and offers more of a contrast with racial demographics in general. Minority
plaintiffs constitute approximately 90% of all plaintiffs. While African
Americans are by far the most frequent racial group at 81.6% of all
plaintiffs, the percentage of White American plaintiffs is larger than that of
either Hispanic or Asian American plaintiffs. Native Americans are
virtually invisible as a plaintiff group with only one case.
Figure 2
Race or Ethnicity of Plaintiff Employees
In Labor Force

In (aises
Wh

te

,, t86%
A
ica>
m
\r
..........
(i
9 39%

47%

11.90% of the labor force and 12.21% of the general population; Asian Americans constitute 3.85% of
the labor force and 3.86% of the general population.) Given the work context of racial harassment
cases, however, we opt to use the labor force percentages for comparisons. The percentage for Hispanic
Americans is based on a calculation in which Hispanics are deducted from each racial group and their
participation in the labor force is taken into account. For a detailed description of these calculations,
contact the authors.
65. In coding race or ethnicity, the study uses the racial or ethnic category indicated in the judicial
opinion, although the authors recognize that the objective determination of "race" and "ethnicity" is
contestable. There also are three additional cases where the plaintiff is identified as "not white."
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The racial distribution of plaintiffs in these cases varies in distinctive
ways from the racial distribution in the general labor force. As shown in
Figure 2 and Table 1, the comparison of Blacks and Whites is most
dramatic. African Americans constitute approximately 12% of the labor
force, yet constitute over 80% of plaintiffs in racial harassment cases. In
contrast, while Whites constitute approximately 70% of the labor force,
they are plaintiffs in less than 9% of racial harassment cases. Asian
Americans are plaintiffs at only a slightly higher percentage than their
percentage in the general population; Hispanics and Native Americans are
notably underrepresented in the plaintiff class relative to their
representation in the labor force.
We can further study this data by looking at the intersection of gender
and race, keeping in mind that the number of individuals in the resulting
groups is sometimes small. As shown in Table 2, minority men are more
Among African
likely than minority women to bring these cases.
Americans and Asian Americans, approximately 60% of each plaintiff
group is male. All the Hispanic plaintiffs are men. In contrast, the
percentages are reversed among White Americans, with women more likely
to be plaintiffs than men.
Table 2. Intersection of Plaintiffs' Race and Gender

African Americans:
Women
Men
Asian Americans:
Women
Men
Hispanic Americans:
Women
Men
White Americans:
Women
Men

Gender as % of
Each Plaintiff Group
in Cases

(N)

Gender as % of Each Racial Group
in Labor Force in General

42.0
58.0

(81)
(112)

54.6
45.4

36.4
63.6

(4)
(7)

47.7
52.3

0
100.0

(0)
(11)

42.3
57.7

61.9
38.1

(13)
(8)

46.5
53.5

When we compare these groups' representation in the study to their
representation in the labor force, some interesting patterns emerge. African
American and Asian American women are underrepresented as plaintiffs
(varying from about 11-13% less than their percentage in the labor force),
while Hispanic women are drastically underrepresented (in fact, not
represented at all). Thus, it appears that minority women are less likely
than their male counterparts to bring racial harassment cases. In contrast,
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White women are overrepresented (about 15% more than their percentage
in the labor force), suggesting that they are more likely to bring racial
harassment cases than White men.
(b) Employment Profile. While a common perception may be that
harassment occurs only in non-professional occupations, the data shows
plaintiffs in a wide range of occupations.6 6 As displayed in Table 3, while
approximately 80% of the plaintiffs are in the service and support
occupational category, almost 20% are in the management and professional
occupational category. 67 Management occupations include financial
analysts and managers, hotel managers, accountants and auditors,
information systems managers, and a range of other management roles.
Plaintiffs in professional occupations include lawyers, doctors, architects,
engineers, counselors, social workers, educators, psychologists, scientists,
and economists.
Table 3. Plaintiffs' Occupations

As % of Cases

(N)

19.3
10.7

(45)
(25)

8.6

(20)

Service and Support:

80.7

(188)

(Select Categories)
Office and Administrative
Production
Protective Services

21.5
10.7
8.2

(50)
(25)
(19)

7.3
5.2
4.7
4.3

(17)
(12)
(11)
(10)

Management and Professional:
Management

Professional Occupations

Sales
Installation and Repair
Transportation
Healthcare Support

66.

The plaintiffs' occupations are coded according to a categorization system provided by the

U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK (2006),

available at http://www.bis.gov/oco/home.htm. There are over 24 different occupational categories
under the major headings of management and business and financial operations occupations,
professional and related occupations, and service occupations. In addition, the authors added seven
categories which appear distinguishable from the 24 original categories. (Complete details are on file
with the authors.)
67. These percentages are based on the 233 cases in which the plaintiffs' occupation is indicated.
This study thus substantiates that discriminatory harassment allegedly occurs at all occupational levels,
including among management and professionals. See also Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII
to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1982).
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Service and support occupations are varied, including the examples in
Table 3.68 The occupation with the most plaintiffs in any category is office
and administrative supervision positions (with over 20% of all plaintiffs),
which include secretaries, office assistants, computer operators, drafters,
and phone operators. Following in size among service and support
occupations are plaintiffs in production, which includes assemblers,
fabricators, machinists, welders, food processing, textile production, and
woodworkers. The next largest group is protective services occupations,
which include police, firefighters, security personnel, corrections officers,
and park rangers.
Many plaintiffs are long-time employees; their average tenure is 8.36
years.69 (This runs counter to the notion that increased contact and working
with people of different races inevitably decreases racism and that people
can only be uncivil to "strangers. ' )
2.

Defendants' Profile *

In addition to learning about the individuals who are the targets of
harassment, we learned about the individuals and companies who are
accused of misconduct. This study considers the gender and race of the
accused harassers; whether the alleged harassment is committed by a single
individual or multiple individuals; whether the harassers are supervisors,
co-workers or both; and the industry and employer settings in which they
work.
(a) Individual Harassers. The race and gender of the alleged harassers
reveals interesting patterns, as shown in Table 4. For instance, men
constitute two-thirds and women one-third of the alleged harassers.7 ' About
three-quarters of these individuals are White, although 20% are Black and a
small percentage are Asian."

68. All other service and support occupations have nine or fewer cases.
69. This average is based on the 207 cases for which tenure is indicated.
70. In some cases, the alleged harasser is a new boss or coworker.
71. The gender of the accused harassers is indicated in 144 cases.
72. The race of the alleged harasser is indicated in 85 cases. There are seven additional cases
where the defendant is identified as a race other than the plaintiffs race, but the opinion did not indicate
the specific race or ethnicity.
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Table 4. Alleged Harassers' Cnder and Race
As %ofAll Cases
Gender
Women
Men
Race:
African An-ican
Asian Anerican
W"hite Anerican

(N)

Asoo

33.3
66.6

(48)
(96)

46.6
53.4

20.0
5.9
74.1

(17)
(5)
(63)

11.9
3.9
70.0

rForcein

As compared to the general labor force, there are fewer women

harassers and more men harassers than one might expect. Interestingly, as
shown in Figure 3 and Table 4, there are more Black and Asian accused
harassers than one might expect given their percentages in the workforce.
White harassers, on the other hand, approximate their percentage in the
labor force, while Hispanics are not represented at all in these cases.
Figure 3
Race of Alleged Harassers
In Cases

I Labor Force
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observations when we consider the race and the gender of defendants
simultaneously. As indicated in Table 5, it appears that both African

American men and White men are more likely to be accused of racial
harassment than are their female counterparts. 3 White men constitute
about two-thirds of White defendants; and Black men constitute 8000 of

73. Among Asian American defendants, two are women and none are men. In two cases, the
defendants are identified as African American but their gender is not indicated. Hence, there are fewer
cases with African American harassers indicated in Table 5 than in Table 4.
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Black defendants, although they make up only 45% of African Americans
in the labor force.
Table 5. Intersection of Allegedy assers' Race and Geri
Ciender as %of Each
Defearl G
i
Cases
African Americans:
Wonen
Men
hlite An-icans
Women
Men

(ender as %of Each Racial Coup
i Labor Force inGeneral

20.0
80.0

(3)
(12)

54.6
45.4

33.3
66.7

(21)
(42)

46.5
53.5

While our image may be that harassment most typically occurs one-onone with the harasser being the employee's supervisor, that is not the
complete picture. As shown in Table 6, in about two-thirds of the cases,
plaintiffs claim that more than one person harassed them.
The
organizational status and the group composition of the harassers are also
noteworthy.74 In almost half of the cases, the supervisor is the alleged
harasser, but co-workers are harassers as well (20.7%). Perhaps most
revealing is that in 31% of the cases, the accused harassers include both a
supervisor and a co-worker.
(b) Company Defendants. In racial harassment cases the employing
company is almost always a named defendant.75 (See Table 6.) Some
plaintiffs also sue the specific individuals that they claim harassed them. In
31.5% of the cases, both the company and the individual harasser(s) are
named defendants.

74. The organizational status and the composition of the group of alleged harassers is indicated in
222 cases.
75. This is consistent with Title VII's prohibition of the "employer" (rather than individual
defendants) to engage in discrimination. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (a) (2005).
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Table 6. Defendants' Profile: Alleged Harassers and Employers
As % of Cases

(N)

Number of Harassers:
Individual
More than 1 person
Status of Harassers:
Supervisor Only
Co-Worker Only
Both
Named Defendants:

35.1
64.9

(74)
(137)

47.8
20.7
31.5

(106)
(46)
(70)

Employer
Individual
Private v. Public Sectors Defendants:
Private Sector
Public Sector
Federal
State
Local
Employers' Industries:

96.9
31.9

(252)
(83)

69.6
30.4
4.0
10.3
11.9

(176)
(77)
(10)
(26)
(30)

17.8
13.8
11.7
10.5
10.1
5.7
5.7
5.3
4.9
4.5

(44)
(34)
(29)
(26)
(25)
(14)
(14)
(13)
(12)
(11)

Manufacturing
Health Care and Social Services
Transportation
Corrections and Security
Retail Trade
Finance
Professional Services
Information and Communications
Educational Services
Accommodations and Food Services

Since plaintiffs routinely name their employing company, we could
identify the range of employment settings in which harassment allegedly
occurs. In addition to identifying the company's industry, we determined
that, while about 70% of the work settings in which harassment allegedly
occurs are private businesses, public sector settings are not immune with
about 30% of the cases. 76 (See Table 6.) Among the public sector
employers in the study who identify the level of government in which they
operate, federal government employers are less likely than state or local
employers to be alleged harassers.
Information gleaned from the cases reveals the industrial categories of
the defendant companies. 77 Having both the plaintiffs occupation and the
companies' industry gives us a more complete picture of the employment

76. There are six additional cases where the defendants are unions and utilities but it was unclear
if they are in the private or public sectors.
77. Defendant employers' industries are indicated in 247 of the cases.
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context in which harassment allegedly occurs.78 As with the data on private
sector versus public sector, the data on industrial categories confirms that
charges of racial harassment are not limited to isolated employment
settings.
As illustrated in Table 6, there are allegations of harassment across
many industrial categories in both the private and public sectors.79 The
greatest number of cases occurs in the manufacturing sector (17.8%). This
sector includes all kinds of manufacturing enterprises, including
manufacturers of metal products, computers and electronic products,
appliances, transportation equipment, furniture and related products, food,
plastics, and textiles. Ironically, given their purposes, two categories have
notably high percentages of harassment claims: health care and social
services (including hospitals, nursing homes, and other allied health and
social service facilities) (13.8%) and corrections and security (including law
enforcement, prisons, fire departments and the military) (10.5%).
Professional services including law firms, accounting firms, architectural
and engineering firms, computer services, and consulting services are not
immune with 5.7% of the cases.
3.

Novel FactPatterns

The most common fact pattern by far involves a White supervisor
harassing a minority employee. Novel fact patterns, however, are worth
mentioning.
They prompt us to question our factual assumptions,
suggesting unnoticed but revealing racial dynamics.
They may be
predictive of future patterns. These more novel patterns collectively

78. There has been a range of research on racial discrimination, including racial harassment, in
specific occupational areas. See, e.g., Giselle Corbie-Smith, Erica Frank, Herbert W. Nickens & Lisa
Elon, Prevalences and Correlatesof Ethnic Harassment in the U.S. Women Physicians' Health Study,
74 ACAD. MED. 695 (1999); Aravinda Nadimpalli Reeves, Gender Matters, Race Matters: A Qualitative
Analysis of Gender and Race Dynamics in Law Firms (June, 2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Northwestern University) (on file with author) (noting racial and sexual harassment of African
American attorneys); Heather Antecol & Deborah Cobb-Clark, Identity and Racial Harassment, SOCIAL
SCIENCE
RESEARCH
NETWORK,
DISCUSSION
PAPER
No.
1149
(May 4,
2004),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=547582 (exploring racial harassment in the military).
79. The defendant company's industries are coded according to a Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) system provided by the U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, http://www.osha.gov/pIs/imis/sic-manual.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006), although the
authors added some additional categories that seemed distinguishable from the original SIC categories.
(Complete details are on file with the authors.)
Available government data on employment by industries in general do not use the exact
categories that we use in this study. Thus, generalizations about the study's data should be done
cautiously. With this caveat, it is interesting to note that the industries' percentage of cases in the study
as shown in Table 6 approximate their percentage in employment in general. For instance, these
industries represent the following percentages in employment in general in 2000: manufacturing
(14.7%), health care and social services (11.1%), transportation (7.2%), retail trade (16.5%), finance
(6.4%), and educational services (7.7%). CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 64, at 385 tbl. 591.

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

72

Vol. 27:1

account for over 20% of all the cases in the study, as indicated in Table 7.
Hence, although they are not typical, they also are not rare.
Table 7. Novel Fact Patterns

Same-Race Harassment

3.1

(N)
(8)

Minority-on-Minority Harassment
Minority-on-White Harassment

3.5
3.8

(9)
(10)

Third-party Harassment

1.2

(3)

Contra-power Harassment
Derivative Harassment

3.1

(8)

5.0

(13)

As % of Cases

Some cases are atypical because of the races of the parties. For
instance, in some cases both the harasser and victim are of the same race
("same-race harassment"). In other cases, both the harasser and the victim
are minority, but are of different races ("minority-on-minority
harassment"). Then there are cases with a minority harasser and a White
victim ("minority-on-White harassment").
Some cases are novel because of the status of the parties: they do not
involve the typical pairing of a harassing supervisor and a plaintiff who is
the targeted employee. For example, in some cases the harasser is not a
supervisor or another coworker, but rather a third party such as a customer
("third-party harassment"). In other cases, the power status of the parties of
Rather than a supervisor with ostensible
the parties is reversed.
organizational power, the harasser is an employee who harasses his or her
supervisor ("contra-power harassment"). Finally, in some cases, the
plaintiff employee is not the target of harassment, but rather the target is
some other person such as another employee, a customer, or a family
member ("derivative harassment"). In some of these derivative harassment
cases, the plaintiff-employee may be harassed because of their association
with or support of another person.
B.

Nature of the Harassment

1. Types of Harassment
Consistent with social science research,8" plaintiffs' complaints in this
study indicate that perpetrators use strikingly varied methods of harassment.
We identify over fifty discrete types of harassment. These types of

80.

See supra note 6.
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harassment are grouped in four major categories, similar to categories
recognized in previous research: Verbal Harassment, Physical Objects,
Physical Conduct, and Work-related Decisions. In many cases, plaintiffs
claim they are harassed in more than one way. In any one case, if there are
multiple forms of harassment, each one is identified and coded. Hence, a
plaintiffs claim of harassment might fall in one or all of the categories or in
multiple ways within each category.8 (See Table 8.)
(a) Verbal Harassment. This category includes all forms of spoken
communication and offensive gestures. In 81.2% of racial harassment
cases, 82 plaintiffs claim some form of verbal harassment. While this
communication is sometimes part of a general conversation (31.5%),
comments are more typically directed at the plaintiff (60.4%). A range of
content in verbal harassment also is identified. Over 63% of the cases
include some form of ostensibly race-linked verbal harassment.83 In about a
third of the cases, "nigger" or comparable racial epithets are used.8 4 In
about half of the cases, there is an offensive reference to a racial group but
the "nigger" or other patently offensive epithet is not used. In 11.2% of the
cases, harassment is in the form of racial jokes.
In contrast, in 28.9% of the cases, plaintiffs claim that they are
harassed by a range of comments that are not on their face race-linked, but
which the plaintiffs perceive as racial harassment because of the context in
which the comments occur. These include intimidating, insulting, or
demeaning remarks and other forms of "aversive" verbal racism. Sexrelated comments occur in 9.2% of the cases.

81. Some cases report very detailed accounts of plaintiffs' experiences while others offer more
cursory descriptions. Much of the information obtained in this study is objectively determinable, such
as plaintiffs' job positions or the procedural characteristics of the litigation process. The information on
the nature of the harassment, however, is filtered through the perception of the plaintiffs and then
through the reporting discretion of the judges writing the opinions. Table 8 shows the major harassment
categories and the percentage of cases in which this harassment was noted.
82. Unless otherwise indicated, the percentages indicated in this discussion of the nature of

harassment and as highlighted in Table 8 are based on all 260 cases.
83. See, e.g., Brian Mullen, Ethnophaulismsfor Ethnic Immigrant Groups, 57 J. Soc. ISSUES 457
(2001); Ruth Colker, Whores, Fags, Dumb-Ass Women, Surly Blacks, and Competent Heterosexual
White Men: The Sexual and Racial Morality Underlying Anti-Discrimination Doctrine, 7 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 195 (1995); Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Harassment
Law Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997); Randall L. Kennedy, The David C. Baum Lecture: "Nigger!"
as a Problem in the Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 935.
84.

Examples of other racial slurs reported in the cases include "chinks," "spics," and "wetbacks."
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Table 8. Nature of Harassment
As % of All Cases

(N)

Verbal Harassment

81.2

(211)

Race-Linked Verbal Harassment
Physical Objects

63.9
22.7

(166)
(59)

Ostensibly Race-linked Objects
Physical Conduct
Work-Related Decisions

5.8
15.0
65.8

(15)
(39)
(171)

24.6
58.1
16.2
12.7

(64)
(151)
(42)
(33)

Formal Decisions
Job Development and Enhancement
Denial of Benefits
Questioning Plaintiff's Authority

(b) Physical Objects. This form of harassment, which plaintiffs
claimed in 22.7% of the cases, uses a tangible object or medium. For
example, pictures, decals, cards, photos, graffiti, or posters (including those
with Swastikas, confederate flags or monkeys) are used in 12.7% of all the
cases and letters or emails are used in 5.4% of the cases. Actual physical
objects, such as nooses or Ku Klux Klan-associated attire, are left for
plaintiffs in their work space (and occasionally at the work site more
generally) in 5.8% of the cases."
(c) Physical Conduct. This form of harassment, which plaintiffs
claimed in 15% of the cases, includes the use of physical force, such as
shoving, touching, or hitting of the plaintiff. While it may include physical
conduct of a sexual nature, more typically, the physical conduct is nonsexual. This category also includes damage to property.
(d) Work-Related Decisions. The plaintiffs in 65.8% of the cases
perceive that work-related decisions constitute, or at least contribute, to
racial harassment. Complaints dealing with formal employer decisions
(such as plaintiffs promotion, suspension, demotion, or a denial of
compensation) are found in 24.6% of the cases. Complaints dealing with
employer treatment affecting the employee's job development and
enhancement (such as less favorable assignments, demeaning work,
isolation from meetings, denial of training, denial of essential resources for
work performance, excessive monitoring, and excessive reprimands) are
found in 58.1% of the cases.8 6 Complaints about employer decisions
resulting in a denial of plaintiffs benefits, compensation, or privileges are

85. The use of these racially blatant and offensive objects is apparently on the increase. Press
Release, EEOC, EEOC Chairwoman Responds to Surge of Workplace Noose Incidents at NAACP
Annual Convention (July 13, 2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/7-13-00-b.html (noting
increase in racial harassment complaints about hanging nooses in the workplace).
86. The most frequent claims within this sub-category are less favorable assignments (28.1%), and
excessive reprimands (22.7%).
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found in 16.2% of the cases. A cluster of complaints dealt with the
employer or others questioning the employee's skills, authority, integrity, or
personal stability (12.7%).
2.

Frequency and Length of Harassment

Harassment occurs over an average of about two and a half years and
includes multiple incidents.87 Unlike sexual harassment claims where
harassment sometimes moves off the work site and into a more social
context,88 plaintiffs in racial harassment cases rarely claim that harassment
occurs outside the work setting.89
C.

Litigation Characteristics

1. Forum
This study analyzes a number of litigation characteristics: forum, type
of proceedings, plaintiffs' claims, and legal issues. 9° The forum of each
case is studied in three ways: the federal circuit, the court level, and the
state. (See Table 9.) Six federal circuits were selected to represent areas
from different parts of the country, including circuits from the northeast,
southeast, south, west, and central parts of the United States. These
circuits, the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and the Eleventh, also
include most of the largest metropolitan areas in the country. 9' We then did
a random sampling of cases within each of these six circuits (without regard
to whether the opinion was from the district court or the appellate court).
About 80% of the resulting opinions were from the district courts with the
remaining 20% from the appellate courts. 92

87.
particular
incidents,
"ongoing

Based on the information in the opinions, it is sometimes difficult to determine when a
harassing incident begins and when it ends. Therefore, we could not count the number of
although we did note if the plaintiff alleged multiple incidents and if the harassment appeared
and continuous."

88.

See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 7.

89.

Only six cases reported harassment outside the workplace.

90. Given the key role that judges play in pre-trial and trial outcomes, increasing attention should
be given to these decision-makers. In a subsequent study by the authors, a detailed profile of judges and
judicial reasoning in racial harassment cases will be considered. In this current study, only one aspect of
the judges' profile, their gender, is considered. The vast majority of racial harassment cases at the
district court level are heard by male judges, with about 82.8% (N = 192) of the cases before male
judges and 17.2% (N = 40) before female judges. Some of the judges preside over more than one case.
91. Seven of the top ten metropolitan areas in 2000 are located in these circuits. CENSUS BUREAU,
supra note 64, at 32-34 (Table No. 30).
92. Some of the judicial opinions randomly selected as a district court case in the study were also
randomly selected as an appellate court case in the study. Approximately 23 cases in the study are
linked in this way. For purposes of analysis, however, they are treated as discrete cases.
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Table 9. Forum
As % of All Cases

(N)

District Courts
Appellate Courts
Federal Circuits:

79.2
20.4

(206)
(53)

First Circuit
Second Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
Select States:*
Alabama
California
Florida
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Louisiana
New York
Texas
Clusterina of States:
Large Diverse States
Smaller Less Diverse States
*These states are also included in the study, but have

3.5
19.6
15.0
33.5
12.7
15.8

(9)
(51)
(39)
(87)
(33)
(41)

6.5
8.9
5.4
3.9
24.2
7.3
4.2
17.7
9.6

(17)
(23)
(14)
(10)
(63)
(19)
(11)
(46)
(25)

70.8
29.2

(184)
(76)

Level of Court:

five or fewer cases: Arizona,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Washington, Wisconsin. There are four other states (Alaska, Nevada, Vermont, and
Mississippi) and Puerto Rico in the six federal circuits indicated in Table 9, but no cases from
these states were randomly selected for analysis.

The Seventh Circuit is the circuit with the highest number of reported
cases (having approximately a third of all cases). The circuit with the.
second highest percentage of cases is the Second Circuit, followed by the
Eleventh, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. A significantly smaller number of

cases in the study come from the First Circuit.
The courts in this study sit in nineteen states. Given their populations,
Massachusetts and Washington have disproportionately fewer racial

harassment cases but Alabama and Louisiana have disproportionately more
cases. 93 Two states account for the lion's share of litigation activity:
Illinois with 24% and New York with 18% of all cases.

While Texas,

California, and Indiana are the next most active states, they each represent
less than 10% of all cases. These states assure some geographic diversity in
93. Their population size is ranked as follows, with "I" designating the state with the largest
population: Massachusetts (13), Washington (15), Louisiana (22), and Alabama (23). CENSuS BUREAU,
supra note 64, at 23 tbl. 19.
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the study since they are located in different parts of the country. In
addition, we clustered the states into two groups: states that have the
largest and most ethnically diverse populations (including New York,
Texas, Illinois, California, Florida, and Georgia),94 and states with smaller
and less ethnically diverse populations (all other states). Over 70% of the
cases in the study are from the large diverse states.
2.

Proceedings,Representation,and Citation

While prospective plaintiffs might initially assume that suing their
employers will eventually culminate in a trial on the merits, the study
suggests that this occurs infrequently.95 Trials on the merits occur in less
than 5% of the district court cases. 96 (See Table 10.) The most typical
judicial opinion in a racial harassment case deals with the district court's
disposition of a defendant's pre-trial motion. (The defendants initiate
proceedings at the district court level in 90% of the cases.) Over 60% of all
the cases and almost 80% of the district court cases deal with a motion for
summary judgment at the district court level. The second most common
proceeding in these cases is a motion to dismiss at the district court level.
Yet in comparison with motions for summary judgment, these proceedings
are far fewer. They constitute 9.2% of all the cases and 11.7% of district
court cases. At the appellate court level, the most likely proceeding
described in judicial opinions is a review of the district court's ruling on the
motion for summary judgment (73.6% of the time). 97 Given that plaintiffs
may appeal the district court's grant of the defendant's motion, it is also not
surprising that the plaintiffs tend to be the moving party (about 80% of the
time) at the appellate court level.
Given the complexity of the dispute resolution process, including the
administrative maze that plaintiffs must follow, one would expect plaintiffs
to have attorney representation to provide expert counsel. Indeed, in only
20.4% of the cases is pro se representation indicated. 99

94. The states in this group are among the top ten states with the largest populations. In addition,
approximately 15% or more of their population is African American, Hispanic, or both. CENSUS
BUREAU, supra note 64, at 23, 27-28.
95. See Adam Liptak, U.S. Suits Multiply, but Fewer Ever Get to Trial, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2003, § 1, at 1; Clermont & Schwab, supra note 7, at 440 (indicating rareness of trials in
employment discrimination cases).
96. These cases are bench trials on the merit at the district court level. At the appellate court level,
3.1,% of the cases dealt with a review of a bench trial at the district court level.
97. In addition, there are two cases of other appellate proceedings other than those indicated in
Table 7. See also Clermont & Schwab, supra note 7, at 449-50 (noting that appeal rates in employment
discrimination cases are higher than in other cases).
98. This compares to pro se representation in all Title VII cases (18.9%), Section 1983 cases
(20.8%), and Section 1981 cases (13.7%). Clermont & Schwab, supra 7, at 434.
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Table 10. Proceedings, Representation, and Citation
As % of Designated Cases
Proceedings (At District Court Level):
Motion for Summary Judgment
Motion for Dismissal
Trial on the Merits
Other Proceedings
Proceedings (At Appellate Court Level):
Review ofC
Motions for Summary Judgment
Bench Trials
Jury Trials
Representation (All Cases):
Attorney Representation
Pro se Representation

Citation (All Cases):
Federal Reporter
On-Line but not in Federal Reporter

(N)

79.1
11.7
4.9
7.3

(163)
(24)
(10)
(15)

73.6
15.1
11.3

(39)
(8)
(6)

79.6
20.4

(207)
(53)

38.8
61.2

(101)
(159)

We also identified cases as either Federal Reporter cases (published
opinions) or cases available only on-line (unpublished opinions).99
Strikingly, only 38.8% of the cases in this study are Federal Reporter cases
(published opinions). (See Table 10.) To state it differently, over 60% of
racial harassment cases are not available through the Federal Reporter
system. Given the large number of cases in unpublished opinions, lawyers
and parties who rely only on published cases are ignoring a substantial
amount of case law that may differ significantly from unpublished cases in
their facts, reasoning, and outcomes.' 0
The high percentage of unpublished cases in this study is consistent
with the current trend among federal circuits."0 ' In 2001, for instance,
64.2% of the appellate court opinions in the D.C. Circuit were unpublished.
This percentage is low compared to the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, where
approximately 90% and 80% of the appellate court opinions, respectively,
were unpublished.' 0

99. All the cases in the study are available on-line through LEXIS, WESTLAW or both electronic
databases. See supra note 10 (describing research methodology). A case was designated a Federal
Reporter case if it had a Federal Reporter citation. About a third of the cases (32.7%) have a citation
(typically from a specialized publication source) other than a Federal Reporter case citation.
100. As Professor Pether points out, the bases on which federal judges and publishers choose to
publish cases in the Federal Reporter are neither consistent nor predictable. See supra note 58.
101. Jonathan Groner, Circuit'sNew Citation Rule: Few Takers, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 6, 2003, at 1,
7; Pether, supranote 58, at 1465 n.139.
102. Groner, supra note 101; Pether, supra note 58, at 1471, 1472. In fact, data from the
Administrative Office of the United States indicates that the percentage of judicial opinions that are
unpublished in the Federal Courts of Appeals has been increasing, reaching 80% in 2000. Michael
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Plaintiffs' Claims

In our search of cases, we identified those judicial opinions where
plaintiffs bring racial harassment claims under the major federal laws for
racial harassment in the workplace: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 or two post Civil War statutes, Sections 1981 and 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.03 Some plaintiffs base their lawsuits on more than one
statutory basis. 114 In particular, as indicated in Table 11, 88% of the cases
include Title VII and 37% include Section 1981 as a statutory basis for their
racial harassment claim. Less than 5% of the plaintiffs in this study base
their claim on Section 1983. Cases in the study with dates after 1991 are
presumed to be covered by the 1991 Act. 10 5 (Almost two-thirds of the cases
fit this description.)
In addition to allegations of racial harassment, plaintiffs often allege
other employer illegalities. (See Table 11 .) 1°6 These concurrent claims
reveal plaintiffs' perceptions of other employer misconduct, including other
forms of discriminatory behavior. It also suggests how racial harassment
and other improprieties may be intertwined.
Some plaintiffs brought separate race discrimination claims charging
their employers with particular intentional business decisions, practices or
conduct that discriminated against them on the basis of their race. 107 These
race discrimination claims occur in 74% of the cases examined. Hence, it
appears that plaintiffs frequently believe that employers both create a

Hannon, A Closer Look at UnpublishedOpinions in the United States Court of Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC.
& PROCESS 199, 200 (2001). See also K. K. DuVivier, Are Some Words Better Left Unpublished?:
Precedent and the Role of UnpublishedDecisions, 3 J.APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 397, 400 (2001).
103. Section 1981 provides that all persons "shall have the right ... to make and enforce contracts
... to the full and equal benefit of all laws . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)
(2006). Section 1983 provides a legal and equitable cause of action for individuals who have been
denied a constitutional or federal statutory right by a state or local government official, such as the right
to equal protection. 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
104. Therefore, as shown in Table 11, the percentages of cases indicated for all three statutory
bases exceed 100%. Ten percent of the cases also include a state statute as the basis for their racial
harassment allegations.
105. Specifically the cases with dates after November 21, 1991 (the effective date of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991) are presumed to be covered by the 1991 Act. Technically, the Act would be
applicable only if the alleged harassment occurred on or after that date. See Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994); Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994). However, the
facts in the judicial opinion did not always provide the dates on which harassment occurred.
106. Sixty-five cases had concurrent claims other than those identified in Table 11.
107. One marker of these cases is that they refer to the framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981) providing for (1) the plaintiff having the burden of proving a primafacie case, (2) the defendant
countering with an articulation of a legitimate reason for the employer action, and (3) the plaintiff
proving the defendant's reasons as pretexual. In contrast, the racial harassment cases focus on whether
the elements of a "hostile work environment" can be shown.
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hostile environment and make specific decisions or institute policies that
are racially discriminatory.
Table 11. Plaintiffs' Claims

Legal Basis of Racial Harassment Claim:
Title VII
Post-Civil War Statutes
1981
1983
Concurrent ClaimsCDiscrimination-Based:
Race Discrimination
Sex-Based Claims
Sex Discrimination
Sexual Harassment
National Origin Discrimination and
Harassment
Age Discrimination
Disability Discrimination
Religious Discrimination
Concurrent ClaimsCOther:
Retaliation
Emotional Distress
Constructive Discharge

As % of All Cases

(N)

87.7

(228)

37.3
4.6

(97)
(12)

73.9
17.3
10.4
13.5

(192)
(45)
(27)
(35)

8.8
3.5
2.3
2.3

(23)
(9)
(6)
(6)

49.2
13.8
10.8

(128)
(36)
(28)

Although not as common as the race discrimination charge, some
plaintiffs also believe that employers discriminate against them on the basis
of sex, national origin, age, disability, or religion.1 °8 In approximately 14%
of the cases, plaintiffs claim both racial and sexual harassment. This raises
interesting questions about the relationship between the two types of
harassment. 0 9
Other concurrent claims are not directly based on discrimination,
although they may be derivative to the allegations of discrimination. They
reveal something about how employees react to employers' harassing
behavior and how employers react to employees' complaints about
harassment. In almost half of the racial harassment cases, for instance,
plaintiffs claim that their employers illegally retaliated against them.
Plaintiffs' concurrent claims of emotional distress in 13.8% of the cases
suggest that some plaintiffs believe their efforts to deal with racial
harassment take a psychological toll. Plaintiffs also included a constructive
discharge claim 10.8% of the time.

108. The distinctions between discrimination based on national origin and on race are not always
clear. See, e.g., St. Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) (ruling that "Arab" is a race
even though it also could be classified as a national origin).
109. See supra discussion accompanying notes 45-49.
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Legal Issues

This section explores the key legal issues raised by the parties and
addressed by the court, most typically as part of the defendant's motion for
summary judgment. The key elements of the plaintiffs' racial harassment
cases are that (i) the harassment is "severe or pervasive" and (ii) the
These are distinct
harassment is "because of [the plaintiffs] race.""'
elements. Thus, there can be "severe or pervasive harassment," but if the
harassment is not attributable to the plaintiffs' race, the claim of racial
harassment fails. Similarly, if the harassment is "because of race" but the
harassment is not sufficiently "severe or pervasive," the claim fails."'
Predictably, the defendant's motion for summary judgment often argues
that one or both of these two elements are missing from the plaintiffs
claim. As shown in Table 12, in over 60% of the cases, the courts address
whether the harassment was sufficiently "severe or pervasive," and in over
a third of the cases, they address whether the harassment was "because of
race" or instead attributable to some alternative reason. This study thus
affirms the primacy of these particular legal inquiries in racial harassment
cases.
The courts also look at procedural issues such as whether the plaintiffs
complaint is timely or whether the plaintiff properly exhausted the
administrative processes and remedies. The plaintiffs noncompliance with
procedural requirements is not infrequently the basis on which racial
harassment suits are terminated. These procedural pitfalls highlight how
important it is for plaintiffs, or more particularly for their lawyers, to
understand the potentially perplexing administrative and judicial process for
employment harassment claims.
Table 12. Legal Issues

Issue
Substantive Issues:
Is harassment "severe or
pervasive"?
Is harassment "because of
race"?
Procedural issues:
Is complaint timely?
Are administrative remedies
exhausted?

Resolution of This Issue
In Plaintiffs' Favor

Issue Raised As
% of All Cases

(N)

61.2

(159)

22.6

(35)

37.7

(98)

17.0

(16)

18.1

(47)

30.6

(11)

4.2

(11)

25.0

(3)

110. Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs, 523 U.S. 75
(1998).
111. While this was not studied empirically, judges sometimes appeared to require that the "severe
or pervasive" requirement was actually a "severe and pervasive" requirement. Hence, in these cases,
harassment had to be both severe and pervasive to sufficiently satisfy this element.
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112
Our study also considers how these specific legal issues are resolved.
Given that many cases have multiple legal issues, the court in any particular
case may resolve each issue differently. "' In only 22.6% of the cases in
which the court addresses and resolves the question "Was the harassment
severe or pervasive?," did the court answer affirmatively." 4 In response to
the question "Was the harassment because of race?," in only 17% of the
cases did the courts answer affirmatively. From the plaintiffs' perspective,
the courts' resolution of procedural issues is similarly dismal. They lose
their argument of a timely complaint over two-thirds of the time and their
argument of exhaustion of their administrative remedies three-quarters of
the time.

5.

Reasonableness Standard

Plaintiffs must show their perceptions of and conclusions about
harassment and hostility in the workplace are "reasonable.""' 5 In the
context of racial harassment cases, this means their arguments that the
harassment was "severe or pervasive" and "because of race" are justified.
In determining whether the plaintiff has met this burden, the judge must
select a point of reference on which to evaluate the plaintiffs' arguments.
As many legal and social science researchers observe, this choice of
perspective can be both complicated and relevant to the outcome. 1 6 They
point out that the courts may choose between the perspective of a
hypothetically gender-neutral, race-neutral "reasonable person," or, in the
alternative, the perspective of a "reasonable person" with the plaintiffs
particular personal characteristics. Thus, this alternative model would use

112. In some cases, the court addresses an issue but does not resolve it. Thus, the percentages
shown in Table 12 are based on the number of cases in which the court both addresses and resolves the
issue. For example, the courts raised the severity issue in 159 cases, but raise and resolve the issue in
only 155 cases. Of those 155 cases, the issue is resolved in the plaintiff's favor 35 times or 22.6% of the
155 cases.
113. How a court resolves a discrete legal issue is not synonymous with how the court resolves the
case as a whole See infra discussion accompanying notes 151-53 (indicating outcomes of cases as a
whole).
114. For instance, the court's affirmative response on the issue of the severity of the harassment
includes its finding that (1) there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the severity of the
harassment to be decided by the jury or other fact-finder, or (2) the facts are undisputed and the plaintiff
has offered enough evidence on the severity issue that a reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff. See
also FED. R. Civ. P. 59; STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 691,693 (4th ed. 2001).
115. Although there is more discourse on the reasonableness standard in the context of sexual
harassment cases, there also are articles that discuss the reasonableness standard when the plaintiff is an
raciallethnic minority. See, e.g., Tam B. Tran, Title VII Hostile Work Environment: A Different
Perspective,9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357 (1998); Melissa K. Hughes, Note, Through the Looking
Glass: RacialJokes, Social Context, and the ReasonablePerson in Hostile Work EnvironmentAnalysis,
76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1437 (2003).
116. See supradiscussion accompanying note 41.
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"a reasonable woman" standard in a sexual harassment claim, or "a
reasonable Hispanic American" standard in a racial harassment claim where
the plaintiff is Hispanic American. Even more particularly, the court could
acknowledge both the gender and ethnicity of the plaintiff and utilize "a
reasonable Hispanic woman" standard." 7
This choice of perspective has important practical significance because
social science research indicates that the "reasonable person" who is White
and the "reasonable person of color" perceive racial prejudice in the
workplace differently."' Thus, each perspective might yield different
conclusions about whether there is harassment, whether the harassment is
severe or pervasive, or whether the harassment is because of the plaintiffs
race.
This study indicates that as far as judges are concerned, the debate on
the appropriate reasonableness standard is essentially academic. While
social scientists and legal scholars argue the nuances of the issue," 9 courts
do not even raise it. Except for the Ninth Circuit, which has expressly
adopted the "reasonable woman" standard, 2 ° other courts cite the
"reasonable person" or comparable standard 2' or do not articulate a
particular standard. Even the judges in the Ninth Circuit do not always
expressly refer to the perspective of the plaintiff's racial group. In only ten
cases (3.9%) in the study did the courts explicitly use a reasonableness
standard based on the plaintiffs race. What is notable in the study,
therefore, is the absence of the reasonableness standard as an issue in the
case law.
III.
OUTCOME OF RACIAL HARASSMENT CASES

Part II informs us about plaintiffs and defendants in racial harassment
cases, types of racial harassment, and the litigation process. Part III ,moves
the empirical analysis further by focusing on the outcome of the cases and

117. This inquiry can take various forms, depending on the nature of the lawsuit. For instance, in a
sexual harassment lawsuit, the focus is how Hispanic women perceive sexual harassment (in comparison
with any other group including African American women). In a racial harassment lawsuit, the focus is
how Hispanic women perceive racial harassment (in contrast to any other group including Hispanic
men).
118. See supra discussion accompanying note 41.
119. Juliano & Schwab, supra note 7, at 582, 584 (Table 6), 577 (also noting that more articles
discuss the reasonableness standard than courts adopting the standard in their study of sexual harassment
cases). A research of social science literature by the authors, for instance, reveals literally dozens of
studies on the reasonableness standard particularly in the sexual harassment context.
120. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
121. Some courts refer to the "reasonable juror," "victim," "person in plaintiffs position" (without
further specificity), or "fact-finder."
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considering how particular characteristics of the parties, the nature of the
harassment, and characteristics of the litigation process affect the outcome.
The outcome of individual cases was determined in the following way.
Each judicial opinion was coded as a "win" for the party whose legal
position the court favors. Thus, an "employee/plaintiff win" means that the
outcome of the legal proceeding described in the judicial opinion is in the
plaintiffs favor; an "employer/defendant win" means the outcome is in the
defendant's favor; and "both the employee/plaintiff and employer/defendant
win" means the outcome is in part in the defendant's favor and in part in the
plaintiffs favor.122 Given that a substantial majority of the cases are
employers' motions for summary judgment, a "plaintiff win" in these cases
means that the motion is denied and a "defendant win" means that the
motion is granted. Given the legal effect of the court's decision on a
motion for summary judgment, the outcome of these proceedings may well
be dispositive.
Our general analysis of outcome begins with the plaintiffs' and the
defendants' overall success rates. When all the cases in the study are
considered, plaintiffs are successful in 21.5% of the cases and defendants
are successful in 81% of the cases.' 23 Thus, defendant employers are much
more likely to "win" than plaintiff employees. Furthermore, this study
indicates that plaintiffs fare worse in racial harassment cases than in sexual
24
harassment cases. 1

In addition to looking at the parties' success and failure rates in all
racial harassment cases as a group, we can also study how the parties fare in
cases with particular attributes. 21 5 This study provides data to answer these
kinds of questions: Does the plaintiffs or defendant's gender or race, for
instance, make a difference in whether the plaintiff wins the case? Does the
kind of harassment weaken or strengthen the defendant's likelihood of

122. In 5.38% of the cases, both the plaintiff and the defendant had a favorable outcome on some
portion of the motion or different motions related to the racial harassment claim. In these cases, both the
plaintiff and the defendant are credited with a "win." Hence, the cumulative percentage of "plaintiff
wins" and "defendant wins" exceeds 100%.
123. Recall that the percentage of cases where plaintiffs win when combined with the percentage of
cases where defendants win exceeds 100%. See supra note 122.
124. See supra note 17; Clermont & Schwab, supra note 7, at 16, 30 (comparing types of
employment discrimination cases).
125. This study also took into account the gender of the judges in the district courts. See supra note
90. When the judge is a woman, it appears to improve the plaintiffs' chances of winning slightly to
27.5%, while the plaintiffs' success rate before a male judge is 21.3%. At the appellate court level,
where cases are typically heard by multiple judges on panels (and where we did not identify the gender
of the judges), the plaintiffs' success rate is 21.1%. See also Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges'
Sex and Race on Judicial Decision Making on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1981-1996 (June,
1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author) (finding that female
judges are more likely than male judges to vote in favor of plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases but
finding no voting differences in race discrimination cases).
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winning? Does the case forum (for example, the state or circuit) correlate
with defendants losing their motions for summary judgment?
While we cannot substantiate a causal link between a case
characteristic and the case outcomes, we can look for reasonable inferences
about what is occurring. In the last part of this article, we explore these
possible explanations. Furthermore, we can statistically test how likely it is
that the results are by chance or not. If the outcome is statistically
significant at the .05 level, for instance, it indicates that the relationship
between that characteristic and the outcome of cases is expected to occur by
chance in only 5 of 100 cases. Similarly, if the relationship is statistically
significant at the .01 level, it indicates that the relationship between that
characteristic and the outcome of cases is expected to occur by chance in
only 1 of 100 cases. Effects that are statistically significant at the .05 level
or .01 level, therefore, are particularly noteworthy because they indicate
that some phenomenon is occurring that is unlikely to be explained by
chance and, consequently, is especially appropriate for further study.
A.

Effect of Parties' Profiles

We consider how a range of other plaintiffs' characteristics affected
case outcomes, as shown in Table 13. For instance, women plaintiffs have
comparable success rates to men, with women employees winning in 20.8%
of their cases compared to men winning in 22.8% of their cases.126 This
occurs even though men have brought more cases than women in recent
years. 27 The success rates of plaintiffs of different races and ethnicities
vary considerably. Asian American and Black plaintiffs have the lowest
percentage of wins, followed by a significant increase of wins by White
plaintiffs.
Hispanic plaintiffs have a statistically significant and a
dramatically higher win rate than any other ethnic group. In the single case
with a Native American plaintiff, the plaintiff loses.

126.

For some variables, the combined percentages of the plaintiffs'

success rate and the

defendants' success rate may exceed 100% because there are some cases in which both the parties
succeed, see supra note 122, or they may be less than 100% because of rounding of percentages. The
combined number (N's) of both plaintiffs and defendants approximates the total sample size for that

variable.
127.

See infra Figure 7.
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Table 13. Effect of Parties' Profiles on Outcomes
Plaintiffs' Success
Rates
Plaintiffs' Gender:
Women
Men
Plaintiffs' Race or Ethnicity:
African American
Asian American
Hispanic American
White American
Alleged Harassers' Gender:
Women
Men
Alleged Harassers' Race:
African American
Asian American
White American
Number of Alleged Harassers:
Individual
More than I person
Status of Alleged Harassers:
Supervisor Only
Co-Workers Only
Both
Defendant Companies:
Private Sector
Public Sector
Federal
State
Local
Length of Employment

(N)

Defendants' Success
Rates

(N)

20.8
22.8

(21)
(33)

81.4
82.2

(88)
(125)

19.3
18.1
54.5".
35.0

(37)
(2)
(6)
(7)

83.0
81.8
63.6
75.0

(159)
(9)
(7)
(15)

18.7
20.8

(9)
(20)

87.5
83.3

(42)
(80)

17.6
20.0
26.9

(3)
(1)
(17)

94.1
80.0
76.1

(16)
(4)
(48)

13.5""
26.2"

(10)
(36)

90.5""
78.1

(67)
(107)

17.0
17.4
32.9""

(18)
(8)
(23)

87.7"
84.8
71.4..

(93)
(39)
(50)

83.5
83.1
80.0
80.8
86.7

(147)
(64)
(8)
(21)
(26)

18.8
(33)
22.1
(17)
20.0
(2)
23.1
(6)
20.0
(6)
As length of E T
P more likely to win

This variable is significantly correlated with the outcome indicated at the .10 level.
.This variable is significantly correlated with the outcome indicated at the
.05 level.
".This variable is significantly correlated with the outcome indicated at the
.01 level.

We consider which of the alleged harassers' characteristics affect the
outcome. Given the small difference in the plaintiffs' success rates when
the harassers are female (18.7%) or male (20.8%), it appears that the gender
of the harasser does not affect the outcome of racial harassment cases.
Thus, it appears neither the gender of the plaintiff nor the gender of the
harasser affects the results. In contrast, the race of the harasser does appear
to make a difference. In comparison to the overall average plaintiffs' win
rate of 21.5%, plaintiffs (who are most likely to be Black) 128 are less likely
to win if the harassers are Black (17.6%) or Asian (20.0%) and more likely
to win if the harassers are White (26.9%).

128.

See supra Table I &Figure 2.
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The number of harassers and their job status also impact case
outcomes. Plaintiffs are about twice as likely to win when there is more
than one harasser. In those cases, they win 26.2% of the time, as compared
to 13.5% of the time in cases when there is a single harasser. Plaintiffs'
success is comparable in cases in which only a supervisor is the harasser
(17.0%) and in cases in which only a coworker is the harasser (17.4%).
Strikingly, however, the plaintiffs' chances of winning go up markedly
(32.9%) when both the supervisor and a co-worker are accused of
harassing.
The win rate of public sector employees is only slightly higher (22.1%)
than private sector employees (18.8%).
Within the public sector, the
success rates of employees at the different level of governments are
comparable, although state employees have a slightly higher percent of
wins. (See Table 13.)
Who the plaintiff names as a defendant also appears to have some
effect. In cases in which only the company is named as a defendant,
plaintiffs win 21% of the time. When both the individual and the company
are named defendants, however, the plaintiffs' success rate improves to
28%. Finally, the length of time that plaintiffs work with their employers
also appears to affect outcome. There is a significant positive correlation
between the plaintiffs' tenure and defendants' winning.129 In contrast to
what one might expect, the longer the employee has been employed, the
more likely the defendant will win the case.
B.

Effect of the Nature of Harassment

The results indicate that the nature of the harassment has some modest
relationship to whether plaintiffs or defendants win the cases. 3 ° (See Table
14.) For example, plaintiffs' success rates are higher when they claim more
physical harassment, either where the harasser uses physical objects (27.1%
success rate) or where the harasser physically harasses the employee or the
employee's property (28.2%), than when plaintiffs claim either verbal
harassment (22.8%) or work-related decisions harassment (21.6%).
Physical conduct of a sexual nature is particularly significant. 3 '
It also appears that when defendants' harassment is blatantly racist,
judges are a little more likely to believe plaintiffs' claims. For instance,
when defendants use ostensibly race-linked physical objects (such as nooses
or Ku Klux Klan-associated attire) (33.3% success rate) or race-obvious
verbal harassment (such as the use of"nigger") (25.9%), plaintiffs are more
likely to win than the average.

129.

These relationships are statistically significant at the .05 level.

130.

See supra discussion accompanying notes 80-86 (explaining various types of harassment).
The correlation of this with plaintiffwins is statistically significant at the .01 level.

131.

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

Vol. 27:1

Table 14. Effect of Nature of Harassment on Outcomes

Verbal Harassment
Race-linked
Physical Objects
Ostensibly Race-linked
Physical Conduct
Work-Related Decisions
Formal Decisions
Job Development
Denial of Benefit
Questioning Plaintiff's
Authority
Length ofLHarassment -I

Plaintiffs'
Success Rates
22.8
25.9
27.1
33.3
28.2
21.6
17.5
20.5
23.8

Cases
(N)
(48)
(43)
(16)
(5)
(11)
(37)
(11)
(31)
(10)

21.9
(8)
As length of Ht1
o win
PPo
morelely
likely to win

Defendants'
Success Rates
80.6
78.3
76.3
66.7
74.4
80.7
81.5
82.1
76.2

Cases
(N)
(170)
(130)
(45)
(10)
(29)
(138)
(52)
(124)
(32)

81.8

(27)

*This variable is significantly correlated with the success rate indicated at the .05 level.

We studied the range of work-related decisions harassment in more
detail to see if judges view different types of employer decisions
differently. The type of decision did not seem to make a great deal of
difference, although when plaintiffs claim that their harassment is
evidenced by an employer's formal decisions (such as denying plaintiff a
promotion, demoting or suspending the plaintiff, or denying the plaintiff
compensation), they have the lowest probability of winning (17.5%).
Plaintiffs' success rate when claiming harassment through other types of
employers' work-related decisions varies between 20.5% to 23.8%.
Interesting relationships between the duration and persistence of the
harassment and the case outcomes emerge from the data. For instance, the
length of the total period of alleged harassment has a significant positive
correlation with plaintiffs' wins and negatively correlated with defendants'
wins. 3 2 This means that the longer the harassment continues, the more
likely the plaintiff will win and the defendant will lose.'33

132. These relationships are statistically significant at the .05 level.
133. While it was difficult (based on the description of the facts in the opinions) to determine when
an incident began and when it ended, we did note whether there were "multiple" incidents of
harassments. Moreover, the study indicated that plaintiffs' wins were positively correlated with multiple
incidents.
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C. Effect of Characteristicsof the Litigation Process
1.

Forum

The parties' success rates in the district courts and the appellate courts
are comparable: plaintiff employees are slightly more likely to triumph in
the appellate court (24.5%) than in the district courts (20.8%), but not by a
significant margin. (See Table 15.) While plaintiffs at the appellate level
follow the general trend in this study of losing, one small subset of cases is
the exception. Plaintiffs have very good odds of winning when appellate
34
judges review the district courts' bench trial decisions.
The study includes cases from six representative federal circuits; and
the outcomes of the cases varied by circuits. Excluding for the moment the
First Circuit, the range of plaintiffs' success rate varies from 12.8% in the
Fifth Circuit to 23.5% in the Second Circuit. Thus, defendants generally
have much higher success rates than plaintiffs, but the gap between the
parties is more dramatic in some circuits than others.'3 5 In the Fifth Circuit,
defendants clearly appear to be favored, with defendants winning a
remarkable 92.3% of the cases. After the Fifth Circuit, the Second Circuit
and the Eleventh Circuit have the next greatest defendants' win rates, both
with over 80%. In contrast to the other circuits, the plaintiffs in the First
Circuit have much more promising odds. In fact, they have better than a
fifty-fifty change of winning. The First Circuit has very few cases (N=12)
relative to the other circuits, so inferences should be made cautiously.
The six federal circuits studied include nineteen states. Of the states in
which there are at least ten cases, the plaintiffs' success rate varies between
a low of 8.6% in California followed closely by 9.1% in Louisiana,
compared to a high of 29.4% in Alabama followed by 21.7% in New York,
136
21.4% in Florida, and 20.6% in Illinois.

134. As shown in Table 16, plaintiffs succeed 75% of the time. See infra discussion accompanying
notes 142-43 (discussing effect on outcome of party who initiates the proceedings).
135. Some legal scholars focus on judicial decisionmaking in particular circuits. See, e.g., Cheryl
L. Anderson, Thinking Within the Box: How Proof Models Are Use to Limit the Scope of Sexual
Harassment Law, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 125, 126-27 (2001) (noting the Seventh Circuit's
rigidity in its treatment of Title ViI, particularly sexual harassment claims, making it more difficult for
plaintiffs to prove their case).
136. In states with fewer than ten cases, it is difficult to draw inferences. However, in New
Hampshire and Wisconsin cases, there is a statistically significant positive correlation with plaintiff

wins; and in Oregon and Hawaii, there is a significant negative correlation with defendant wins.
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Table 15. Effect of Forum on Outcomes

Plaintiffs'
Success Rates
Level of Court:
District Court
Appellate Court
Federal Circuits:
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
Select States:
Alabama
California
Florida
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Louisiana
New York
Texas
Clustering of States:
Larger Diverse States
Smaller Less Diverse
States

Cases
(N)

Defendants'
Success Rates

Cases
(N)

20.8
24.5

(43)
(13)

81.5
79.2

(168)
(42)

55.5**
23.5
12.8
21.8
18.1
21.9

(5)
(12)
(5)
(19)
(6)
(9)

77.7
82.3
92.3'
78.1
75.7
80.4

(7)
(42)
(36)
(68)
(25)
(33)

29.4
8.6
21.4
10.0
20.6
15.8
9.1
21.7
16.0

(5)
(2)
(3)
(1)
(13)
(3)
(1)
(10)
(4)

70.5
86.9
78.5
100.0
79.3
78.9
90.9
82.6
92.0

(12)
(20)
(11)
(10)
(50)
(15)
(10)
(38)
(23)

18.7

(32)

83.0

(142)

26.9

(24)

77.5

(69)

This variable is significantly correlated with the outcome indicated at the 10 level.
This variable is significantly correlated with the outcome indicated at the .05 level.

We also cluster the nineteen states into larger and more ethnically
diverse states or smaller less diverse states,'37 to see if these groupings are
meaningful. The study indicates a dramatic difference between the
outcomes in these clusters. Contrary to what one might predict, plaintiffs
have notably higher success rates in the smaller less diverse states (26.9%)
than the larger diverse states (18.7%).
2.

Proceedings,Representation, and Citation

The type of legal proceeding appears to make a dramatic difference.' 38
(See Table 16.) At the district court level, plaintiffs are successful against
defendants' motion for summary judgment only 16.5% of the time. Judges

137. See supra discussion accompanying note 94.
138. Across all types of employment discrimination claims, plaintiffs fare better at trials than at
pretrial adjudications and better before jury trials than judge trials. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 7, at
17-18 (Display 11).
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are less inclined to grant motions to dismiss.'3 9 In fact, plaintiffs are three
times as likely to be successful against defendants' motions to dismiss, with
a comparatively whopping 50% win rate. The few bench trials on the
merits end with a 20% plaintiffs' success rate. Because motions for
summary judgments are the most common proceeding, 4 ° the parties'
success rates there substantially influences the success rates for all cases.
Table 16. Effect of Proceedings, Representation, and Citation on Outcomes
Plaintiffs'
Success Rates

Cases
(N)

Defendants'
Success Rates

Cases
(N)

Proceedings (Dist. Ct. Level):
Motion for Sum. Judg.
Motion for Dismissal
Bench Trial on the Merits
Other Proceedings
Proceedings (App. Ct. Level):
Review Sum. Judg.
Holding
Review Bench Trial
Review Jury Trial
Representation:
Attorney Representation
Pro-se Representation
Citation:

16.5*
50.0"
20.0
40.0*

(27)
(12)
(2)
(6)

85.2**
54.1"'
80.0
80.0

(139)
(13)
(8)
(12)

12.8
75.0"
50.0*

(5)
(6)
(3)

87.1
37.5"'
50.0""

(34)
(3)
(3)

24.2*
11.3"

(50)
(6)

79.2
88.7

(164)
(47)

30.7*
(31)
75.2*
Federal Reporter
On-Line but not Federal
84.9*
15.7"*
(25)
Reporter
This variable is significantly correlated with the outcome indicated at the. 10 level.
..This variable is significantly correlated with the outcome indicated at
the .05 level.
"*.This variable is significantly correlated with the outcome indicated at the .01
level.

(76)
(135)

Plaintiffs fare very poorly when appellate courts review the district
courts' holdings on motions for summary judgment, winning only 12.8% of
the time.' 4' Plaintiffs do better in other types of proceedings, ranging from
a fifty-fifty chance of winning jury trial reviews to winning three quarters of
139. Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71,73 (1999) (indicating that liberal notice pleading in combination with rules of
amendment under the federal rules of civil procedure have made it difficult to obtain a dismissal on a
discrimination claim based on the pleadings); Linda S. Mullenix, Summary Judgment: Taming the Beast
of Burdens, 10 AM J. TRIAL ADVOC. 433, 469 & n.193 (1987) (concluding that few federal cases are
disposed of based on Rule 12 motions).
140. See supra Table 10.
141. In other employment discrimination cases, defendants also have this advantage. Clermont &
Schwab, supra note 7, at 22, 24-27 (finding that appellate courts hearing employment discrimination
cases are much less likely to reverse defendants' wins in the district courts than to reverse plaintiffs'
wins); Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 62 OHIO ST. L.J.
239 (2001) (substantiating a similar defendants' advantage in ADA cases).
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the appellate courts' reviews of the district court bench trials. The number
of cases in some of these proceedings is small, however, so it is difficult to
draw strong inferences from this sample.
We also consider whether the party who initiates the proceeding (the
movant) makes a difference.'
Although plaintiffs are not the movants at
the district court level very often, when they are movants, their success rate
of 33.3% is notably higher than the average of 21.5%. The situation
reverses at the appellate court level. When plaintiffs appeal the district
court decision, their success rate is notably lower at 15.6%. This finding is
consistent with our observation above that plaintiffs have a particularly
poor success rate at the appellate level.'43 When defendants appeal the
district court rulings, the defendants' success rate is 22%. Thus, while
appellate courts tend to affirm the district courts' holdings, they are less
inclined to do so when the plaintiffs are appealing.
Regarding legal representation, one would predict that plaintiffs that
represent themselves pro se harm their chances of winning in all kinds of
lawsuits.
This would seem particularly likely in employment
discrimination cases, such as racial harassment claims, where the litigation
and administrative rules and process are both complex and evolving. 1" The
study results are consistent with this prediction. There is a dramatic and
statistically significant discrepancy between the outcomes of cases where
plaintiffs represented themselves pro se and of cases where plaintiffs had
legal representation: pro-se plaintiffs are half as likely to win (11.3%) as
plaintiffs with attorney representation (24.2%).
Another variable that correlated with outcome was whether the judicial
opinion is published in the Federal Reporter or available only on-line
(unpublished).
Notably, cases published in the Federal Reporter
("published opinions") have a significantly higher percentage of plaintiff
wins (30.7% success rate) than cases not in the Federal Reporter
("unpublished opinions") (15.7%).
3.

Plaintiffs' Claims

As shown in Table 17, the statutory basis of the plaintiffs racial
harassment claim can significantly affect whether the plaintiffs or the
defendants win.145 Plaintiffs who include Title VII as a basis of their racial

142. In the four cases in which both the plaintiff and the defendant are movants, the plaintiffs are
successful in three of the cases.
143. On the other hand, when both the plaintiff and the defendant are movants, there is a positive
correlation with plaintiffs' wins and a negative correlation with defendants' wins (both at the .01 level).

144. See supra discussion accompanying notes 52-61.
145. We did not study the different combinations of statutory claims nor of cases with only one
statutory claim. It might be, for instance, that cases that are based on Title VII only or on Title ViI and
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harassment complaint have the lowest win rate (21.9%). Plaintiffs who
include Section 1981 have a slightly higher but statistically significant
improvement in their success rate (28.9%). Although the number of
plaintiffs who include Section 1983 as a basis of their claim is
comparatively small, those that do have a much higher win rate than the
other two groups, winning over 40% of their cases.' 46
Table 17. Effect of Plaintiffs' Claims on Outcomes

Basis of Racial Harassment Claim:
Title VII
Post-Civil War Statutes
1981
1983
Concurrent Claims (DiscriminationBased :
Race Discrimination
Sex-Based Claims
Sex Discrimination
Sexual Harassment
National Origin
Discrimination/Harassment
Age Discrimination
Disability Discrimination
Religious Discrimination
Concurrent Claims (Other):

Plaintiffs'
Success Rates

Cases
(N)

Defendants'
Success Rates

Cases
(N)

21.9

(50)

80.7

(184)

28.9"
41.7*

(28)
(5)

78.4
66.7

(76)
(8)

84.9".
82.2
77.8
82.9

(163)
(37)
(21)
(29)

18.22 **
22.2
29.6
20.0
21.7
22.2
33.3
16.7

(135)
(10)
(8)
(7)
(5)
(2)
(2)
(1)

89.6
100.0
83.3
83.3

82.0
19.5
(25)
Retaliation
75.0
30.6
(11)
Emotional Distress
(10)
57.1...
35.7*
Constructive Discharge
This variable is significantly correlated with the success rate indicated at the. 10 level.
..This variable is significantly correlated with the success rate indicated at the .05
level.
.. This variable is significantly correlated with the success rate indicated at
the .01 level.

(20)
(9)
(5)
(5)
(105)
(27)
(16)

In addition to the racial harassment claim, plaintiffs may bring
concurrent claims. 4 7 (See Table 17.) Among the overall discriminationbased concurrent claims, plaintiffs who bring a concurrent racial

Section 1981 but not Section 1983, have higher (or lower) plaintiffs' success rates than the groupings we
did study.
146. This is in contrast to a study of employment discrimination cases that are filed and terminated
in the federal courts, where the win rates of the three types of statutory cases are similar, but showing
that Title VII cases had the highest and Section 1981 cases had the lowest win rates. Clermont &
Schwab, supra note 7, at 18 (Display 11).
147. Sixty-five (25%) of the racial harassment cases have concurrent claims other than those
identified in Table 17. If one were to study representative disability harassment or religious harassment
cases, for example, the plaintiffs' success rate would be distinct from the success rate in racial
harassment cases with concurrent disability or religious harassment claims. Thus, the outcomes in cases
in this study are not predictive of the outcomes in those cases.
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discrimination claim 48 have a significantly lower success rate in their racial
harassment case (18.2%). In contrast, adding a sex discrimination claim
appears to improve plaintiffs' success rate to about 30%, while a sexual
harassment claim seems to have little effect.
Other concurrent
discrimination-based claims have varied effects, but for many of these
cases, the number is small so it is difficult to draw inferences.
We consider further the gender of the plaintiffs who brought sex-based
claims and whether their gender makes a difference on outcome.

49

Not

surprisingly, most of these plaintiffs are women (35 out of 43).
Interestingly, the women plaintiffs who also bring a sex-based claim help
their racial harassment case slightly (winning 25.7%), but men plaintiffs
hurt their racial harassment case (winning only 12.5%). This gender
difference is statistically significant. 5 '
Among the concurrent claims, both constructive discharge and
emotional distress claims appear to help plaintiffs' chances of winning their
racial harassment claims. When these claims are included in the lawsuits,
the plaintiffs' chances of winning improve to over 30%. Many cases
include retaliation claims, but their inclusion appears to slightly depress
plaintiffs' position regarding their racial harassment argument.
4.

Legal Issues

As we discussed earlier (see Table 12), this study indicates how the
courts resolve specific legal issues, such as whether the harassment is
"severe or pervasive.""'i' Table 18 indicates the plaintiffs' success rate in
the case as a whole when the "severe or pervasive" harassment is raised
(and in which the parties may have raised other issues as well).
Not unexpectedly, the particular issues before the court can make a
statistically significant difference in the outcome of the case as a whole.
When the defendants raise the core issues of the severity or pervasiveness
of the harassment or of racial attribution ("because of race"), the plaintiffs'
prospects of winning the case as a whole are particularly dismal. Plaintiffs
lose their cases 82.4% of the time when the courts are asked to consider
whether the harassment is severe or pervasive enough and an astounding
87.8% of the time when the courts are asked to consider whether the
employer's conduct is racially motivated or attributable to some other basis.

148.

See supra discussion accompanying note 107 (distinguishing between racial harassment and

racial discrimination claims).
149.

These sex-based claims include sex discrimination and hostile environment but not quid pro

quo harassment claims.
150.

At the .01 level of significance.

151.

See also supradiscussion accompanying notes 110-14.
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Table 18. Effect of Legal Issues on Outcomes

Issue
Substantive Issues:
Is harassment "severe or
pervasive"?
Is harassment "because of
race"?

Procedural issues:
Is complaint timely?
Are administrative remedies
exhausted?

Plaintiffs'
Success Rates

(N)

Defendants'
Success Rates

(N)

18.9

(30)

82.4

(131)

12.2""

(12)

87.8"

(86)

25.5

(12)

80.9

(38)

27.3

(3)

72.7

(8)

*This variable is significantly con-elated with the success rate indicated at the .05 level.

This data also substantiates that plaintiffs who succeed in regards to
one issue do not necessarily succeed in regards to another issue or win the
case as a whole. For instance, the courts resolve the "because of race" issue
in the plaintiffs' favor 17% of the time (Table 12), but plaintiffs win these
cases as a whole only 12.2% of the time (Table 18). Apparently in some
cases where the plaintiffs succeed on the racial attribution issue, they are
52
defeated on another critical issue. 1
As indicated in Table 18, when the defendants raise procedural issues,
the plaintiffs' chances of winning the case as a whole are about one in four.
This is comparable to the average plaintiffs' win rate of 21.5% for all cases.
As we have noted, courts tend not to discuss the appropriateness of one
reasonableness standard over another.'53 In the ten cases in which the
courts did expressly cite their use of the reasonableness standard of the
plaintiffs race, however, the plaintiffs won three of those cases. While this
is still dismal plaintiffs' odds, it is slightly better than the average plaintiffs'
success rate of 21.5%.
IV.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

This extensive empirical study provides rich data on racial harassment
case law based on a detailed analysis of a representative sample of federal
district court and appellate court cases between 1976 and 2002. Prior to
this study, employees, employers, judges, lawyers, and academics had to

152. In the relatively few cases in which the issue of individual harassment is before the court, the
plaintiffs' chances of winning their case are substantially improved (53.3% success rate). This is true
even though the courts tend not to resolve the particular issue of individual harassment in the plaintiffs'
favor (resolved in plaintiffs' favor only 25% of the time).
153. See supra discussion accompanying notes 115-21.
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speculate about the factual backgrounds, the litigation processes, and the
outcomes of these cases. This article reveals who brings these cases, the
kinds of harassment they claim, the critical issues the courts consider, and
the most frequent fora, among other important topics. These cases offer a
glimpse into the nature of racial harassment in the workplace-suggesting
for instance, who the perpetrators are and how they harass their targets.
In this final part of the paper, we briefly highlight key findings of this
study and offer plausible explanations of these results. We shift, therefore,
from a statistical description of the case characteristics (in Part II) and the
case outcomes (in Part III), to an integrated analysis and discussion of some
of these results. In addition, we consider how these characteristics and
outcome vary over time.
A.

Highlights of Key Findings

1. Rogers Marked the Beginning of Racial Harassment Litigation in
1971. However, Racial Harassment Jurisprudence Has Been Crafted
Largely in the Last Fifteen Years

After Rogers, plaintiffs were slow to utilize a racial harassment theory.
As illustrated in Figure 4, there are comparatively few cases each year
between 1981 and 1991, a spike in 1992, some activity between 1993 and
1996, and then a clear annual increase every year from 1997 on. In fact,
about 87% of all cases occurred since 1991, presenting judges with the
opportunity to shape the doctrine during this period. 15 4 Moreover, because
racial harassment law has received less attention than sexual harassment
law, judges have been able to craft the laws largely unmonitored by
legislators, academics, and advocacy groups.
What explains the surge of cases beginning in the nineties? Legal
developments and societal events prior to and during this time do not
necessarily favor plaintiffs' position.
They may have nonetheless
heightened public awareness of harassment in the workplace, including
racial harassment, and possible legal causes of action. The Anita Hill and

154.

The growth in racial harassment cases generally reflects the same growth pattern of all

employment discrimination cases. Employment discrimination cases have become an increasingly
larger percent of federal civil cases, constituting nearly 10% by 2000. Clermont & Schwab, supra note
7, at 1, 429-30 (based on a study of civil cases, including employment discrimination cases-Title VIl,
ADA, § 1983, ADEA, § 1981, and FMLA-that terminate in a federal district court or court of appeals).

While employment discrimination cases peaked in 1998, however, racial harassment cases continued
their upward trend.
While the number of racial harassment cases has increased in the last decade and a half, these
cases still represent only a very small percent of employee complaints of racial harassment. Many
employee allegations of racial harassment are never considered by the judicial system. Legal standards
may be so daunting that some prospective plaintiffs, even those with legitimate claims, decide that
pursing a remedy through the judicial system is not worth the effort.
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Clarence Thomas hearings in 1991 and important Supreme Court cases
occurring in 1994 and 1998 brought these issues to the fore. These events
particularly may have motivated certain plaintiffs who in the past felt their
claims were not legally cognizable.' 55 For instance, cases brought by
African American plaintiffs show a greater increase than cases brought by
other racial and ethnic groups (Figure 5). At the same time, documented
evidence of plaintiffs' dismal prospects in these kinds of lawsuits was not
available until this study. Lawyers could only speculate on the general
prospect of winning or losing and they may have overestimated the
probability of success.

155. Major legal events in contemporary harassment jurisprudence include: the Meritor case in
1986, the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the Harriscase in 1994, and the Oncale, Faragher,and Ellerth cases in
1998. See supra notes 27-29. The impact of major legal events is difficult to ascertain. Among other
issues, there is an undeterminable time lag between the legal events and their consequences. As we have
noted, the time between the beginning of a plaintiffs dispute resolution process (perhaps prompted in
part by a particular legal event) and when a district court decides the defendant's motion and reports it,
may be years. Nonetheless, we can at least observe to what extent these legal events appear to prompt
or chill reported racial harassment litigation in the cases in general and in the different groupings of
cases above.
Given Figure 4, the Meritor case in 1986 appears to have had minimal short-term effect,
perhaps because the case was perceived as a sexual harassment case rather than one dealing more
broadly with harassment in general. The 1991 Act was much heralded as pro-plaintiff which may have
spurred increased litigation in 1992. While the Hill-Thomas hearings in 1991 are remembered mostly as
focusing on sexual harassment issues, much of the conduct at issue had racial overtones as well. There
also was controversy over to what extent the Act would be retroactive, which may also have spurred
some litigation activity. The Harris case in 1994 marks the beginning of a small incremental increase in
lawsuits. The 1998 cases, however, are part of the dramatic surge in cases that began in 1997. While
we can only speculate on their precise influence, these 1998 cases perhaps in conjunction with the
cumulative impact of the prior legal events including the 1991 Act, do not appear to have chilled
litigation.
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Figure 4
Cases Brought and Won by All Plaintiffs
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It may also be that racial harassment in the workplace simply
increased, as suggested by EEOC statistics on employee complaints.
Finally, judges may have been particularly willing to hear, write, and
release opinions on racial harassment. Perhaps they were cognizant of an
increasing number of charges and sensed an opportunity to influence
evolving legal principles.
2. Throughout the History of Racial History Litigation, Plaintiffs as a
Group Have Been Much More Likely To Lose and Defendants as a Group
Have Been Much More Likely To Win

Although the volume of cases increased over time, as shown
graphically in Figure 4, plaintiffs' and defendants' success rates in general
did not change much over the entire 21 year time period. 5 6 On average, the
plaintiffs' probability of winning a case between 1981 and 1991 was about
one in four. When cases increased in number between 1992 and 2002, the
plaintiffs' average success rate dropped to 20.8%.
156. There were only a few cases between 1976 and 1981, so that an analysis by year did not
appear meaningful. In 1984, there were no reported cases in our sample; and in some years there were
cases but none of which the plaintiffs won.
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Furthermore, summary judgment proceedings constitute a substantial
portion of racial harassment cases. District court judges effectively act as
gatekeepers, often granting defendants' motions and effectively terminating
plaintiffs' claims.
Why are plaintiffs so likely to lose and defendants so likely to win?
Many explanations are possible (but only those explanations consistent with
the data are ultimately persuasive). One could theorize that defendants
settle their weak cases before litigation to avoid negative publicity and only
litigate stronger cases or that defendants have better lawyers given their
resources. Yet an alternative theory could predict that plaintiffs and their
lawyers, given their limited resources, are particularly careful to determine
the quality of their cases and only proceed with what they believe are high
quality cases. After all, attorneys' fees based on contingency arrangements
result only if plaintiffs are successful. In either case, these individual case
attributes would be expected to balance out for both sides statistically
because of the high number of cases analyzed. It is unlikely, for example,
that plaintiffs and their lawyers would consistently be four times more
likely to misjudge the quality of their case over a ten year period.
A more plausible explanation is that some systematic factor is at play,
such as judges as a group being biased in favor of defendants (or biased
against plaintiffs).'5 7 When faced with the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, for instance, the judge must decide which party's position is the
most convincing. As products of their socialization, judges may be
consciously and deliberately, or as likely, unconsciously and
unintentionally biased.
3. Racial Harassment Appears To Be Widespread in the American
Workplace (Tables 3, 6 and Figure 1)
Contrary to the societal belief that incidents of racial harassment are
isolated, this study suggests otherwise. Plaintiffs' occupations range from
lower-level service and support jobs to professionals of all kinds, including
doctors and lawyers. Plaintiffs work in all kinds of industries and in all
levels of the private and public sectors. The increase in litigation over time
157.

Theresa Beiner proposes that a confluence of circumstances have led to increasing judicial

hostility toward harassment claims and judicial inclination to use (and misuse) summary judgments,
often resulting in inappropriate and premature dismissal of cases. Beiner, supra note 139, at 119-23,
97-118. For instance, she cites legal developments relating to summary judgments that effectively make
it easier to grant these motions. Judges also appear skeptical of legal developments, such as the Harris
case's clarification of the plaintiffs' proof of damages and Civil Rights Act of 1991's confirmation of
the availability of jury trials. See also Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So
Hard To Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 557 (2001) (also observing the "general consensus" that
employment discrimination cases are too easily filed and too easily won, but countering that "this
picture is grossly distorted ...these suits are far too difficult, rather than easy, to win").
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also suggests that these employees believe racial harassment is increasing
rather than declining, or that harassment is occurring at the same level but
these employees are less willing to put up with it. At the same time, there is
evidence that many employees are reluctant to complain and litigate, even
though they believe they have been racially harassed.' 58
4. Blacks Are DisproportionatelyRepresented as Plaintiffs (Given Their
Percentage in the LaborForce) (Table 1, Figure 2)
What explains the racial composition of plaintiffs? Given the large and
representative sampling of cases, a plausible explanation is that the
plaintiffs' composition simply mirrors what is happening in the workplace:
Blacks constitute a disproportionately high percentage of plaintiffs in these
cases because they are particularly and disproportionately targeted. It may
also be that Blacks are the most conscious of racism and the most likely to
complain about it.' 59
We should also note groups that are not bringing as many lawsuits as
we might expect given their percentage in the labor force, and consider why
they are not using the judicial system. There is substantial evidence that
Hispanics are targets of harassment in American society, including in the
workplace. 6 ' Hispanic plaintiffs, however, are underrepresented relative to
their percentage in the labor force. Are Hispanics less likely to complain
formally about workplace harassment because of cultural characteristics,
lack of knowledge of legal resources and remedies given language or
socioeconomic limitations, or other legal risks that might be implicated?
For example, a subset of Hispanics whose immigration status does not
allow them to work legally in this country, may opt to ignore racial
harassment rather than bring attention to their immigration status. Thus,
before they bring a lawsuit, their work situation may need to be extremely
intolerable and egregious.' 6'
The Black-White binary paradigm of race may also unduly shape racial
harassment laws. Judges have in mind Black plaintiffs and White

158.

See supra note 53.

159.

Hispanic American, Asian American, and White American plaintiff groups had modest

increased litigation activity beginning in the mid 1990s. Given this relatively brief litigation history, it is
unclear if these early cases are representative of future cases to be brought by members of these racial
groups. It is possible, for instance, that given the novelty of their claim that these plaintiffs were more
risk-taking. It is also possible that plaintiffs and their counsel pursued litigation in these pioneering
cases in part because they felt they had particularly strong cases.
160. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1273-75

(1992) (describing discriminatory stereotypes of Mexican Americans).
161. Such a hypothesis would explain in part the comparatively high 54.5% success rate of
Hispanic plaintiffs.
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defendants, so that other types of workplace discrimination that Hispanics
and Asians face-for example, based on accent, perceived foreignness, or
immigration status-might not strike lawyers and judges as racial in nature.
For many, "race" means "Black" and Blacks do not tend to experience
harassment on these grounds.162 The law of racial remedies, including
harassment law, might turn out to be available to Hispanics and Asians only
to the extent they succeed in analogizing what happened to them to events
that, if they happened to Blacks, would be actionable.
Figure 5
Cases Brought by Plaintiffs' Race
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See FEAGIN, supra note 3, at 203-08 (describing Black-White paradigm).
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Figure 6
Cases Brought and Won by Black Plaintiffs
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5. Minority Men Are More Likely Than Minority Women To Be
Plaintiffs'63 (Table 2)
What explains this gender disparity among minorities? Are minority
men more likely targets of racial harassment and more likely to complain
about it? Or is it that when minority women are harassed, they are less
likely to perceive themselves as targets or to bring and maintain lawsuits?
The absence of Hispanic women plaintiffs, for instance, prompts us to ask
why this group does not utilize the legal system to address racial
harassment abuses in the work environent. Perhaps minority women who
experience both sexual and racial harassment do not pursue a racial
harassment cause of action, choosing instead to incorporate racial
harassment into their sexual harassment cause of action. They may do this
at the advice of their lawyers who are more familiar with and thus are
drawn toward sexual harassment laws. Their lawyers may further recognize
strategic disadvantages of bringing both racial harassment and sexual
harassment claims. For instance, lawyers may believe that judges will
"6count" a racially tainted sexual insult toward either a racial harassment
claim or a sexual harassment claim but not toward both claims.

163.

In contrast, White women are more likely than White men to be plaintiffs.
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6. Black and Asian Plaintiffs Lose a Higher Percentage of Cases Than
Other Racial Groups (Tables 2, 13)
The number of cases brought by Blacks surged beginning in the midto late- nineties and has continued to increase. (See Figure 5.) At the same
time that the number of Black plaintiffs was increasing, their prospects for
winning were declining. As depicted in Figure 6, compared to the period of
1981-1991 when Black plaintiffs' average success rate was 22.7%, the
success rate was 19.3% between 1 9 9 2 - 2 0 0 2 .1"
More recently in
1999-2002, while their cases steadily increased, their success rate was
18.7%. Judges appear to be increasingly critical of African American
plaintiffs, perhaps as a way of coping with what they perceive as the
excessive number of cases.
Perhaps Blacks bring a broader range of cases, some with weaker facts.
Once again, however, this is statistically unlikely over such a large number
of cases. A more likely explanation is that courts have different tolerance
levels for what is permissible harassment. Courts might demand more
extreme employer misconduct before they conclude that Blacks and Asians
have been "severely and pervasively" harassed. Judges, who tend to be
White, may also be more unconsciously empathic with White plaintiffs'
claims, thus finding their positions more persuasive.
7. When ConsideringAll Cases, the Plaintiffs' Gender Does Not Seem To
Affect Outcome; in Recent Years, However, Men Have Been More Likely To
Be Successful (Tables 2, 13)
Men and women plaintiffs have had very different success rates over
time. (See Figure 7.) Although women did not bring many cases during
1981-1991, they had a comparatively high average 44.4% win rate. This
contrasts markedly with their average win rate of only 17.5% during
1992-2002. The success rate for men who brought lawsuits improved over
time. Between 1981-1991, it averaged 15% (substantially lower than
female plaintiffs during that period). Between 1992-2002, it averaged
22.1%. (During this period, the number of male plaintiffs also dramatically
increased while the number of female plaintiffs stayed flat.) Thus, the trend
in recent years is that women bring fewer racial harassment cases and are
more likely to lose their litigation than men. It appears that, even without
our empirical evidence, women employees are getting the message that
courts are increasingly inhospitable to their claims.

164. There are too few cases for other racial and ethnic groups to meaningfully analyze their wins
over time.
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Figure 7
Cases Brought and Won by Gender
For Male Plaintiffs
304

(n
0
o
,-

0O

-

25

ETotal
0] Wins

20 ,,

L

10

_______

51 -

---

-

o
U) r-CD 0

00
M

co~~

00

OD
W
0 M

W0

0 M

0)

.

C

M

0 M

N
0
M

M

0 M0

')_m_
M

-

M

0

0

0

0
0

0
0

0
0

Year
For Female Plaintiffs
30--o

u 25-

25-

E Total

C.)~ 20 i

]0Wins

0
.0E

S15~
10

5

_
-

.
co
0

..
CD
o
0
0)0)0)0)

m, C.

N

WWG00
N)
000
80)0)0
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr

LL.L
M

kI.
(

0

CD
0)00

S0

000

-

4N

0
N1

N1

Year
8. Alleged Harassers Are More Likely To Be Men and To Be White.
(Tables 2, 14)
Men and whites are more likely to hold supervisory or other dominant
positions in organizations than women or minorities, and therefore they
may believe they can use their positions of power to harass without
reprisals. It may also be that these groups are more inclined to harass
because, for reasons that are unclear, they are more prejudiced toward
minority employees and choose to manifest that prejudice by harassing
them. (Given minorities' perception that the workplace is racist, it may also
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be that some minority employees are more likely to label the conduct of
these groups as racial harassment, when in fact, the conduct may not be
racially motivated. 65) Finally, Whites also constitute a significant majority
of the labor force, so the frequency of their harassing actions may simply be
a reflection of their large numbers in the workplace.
The data indicates another interesting phenomenon.
Given their
representation in the labor force, men, Blacks, and Asians are
disproportionately represented as alleged harassers.166 Moreover, minority
harassers target the full range of employees, including Whites, other
minority groups, and members of their own race. Minority harassers may
"just be going along" with ridicule instigated by their bosses and coworkers
or they may be manifesting their own within-group prejudices or animosity
toward other racial groups. 167 Thus, racial harassment is not just a Whiteon-Black phenomenon.
9. Plaintiffs Are More Likely To Win if Harassers Are White Than if
HarassersAre Minorities (Tables 7, 13)
The race of the harasser also makes a difference to outcome. Plaintiffs
(who are most likely to be Black) win a slightly higher percentage of cases
if the alleged harassers are White rather than Black. In fact, in the nine
cases in which both the plaintiffs and the harassers are minority (minorityon-minority harassment), the plaintiffs lost eight of the cases. Based on this
small sub-sample, there is some indication that courts find minority-onminority harassment even less plausible than White-on-minority
harassment. 6 It could be that the mostly White judges are not familiar
with intra-minority group "racial" tensions and harassment. Judges may not
be aware of African Americans harassing each other because of variations
of skin color, Hispanics harassing each other because of differences in
immigration status, or Asians harassing each other because of historical
animosities based on countries of origin.
165. Some White employees, given societal or organizational pressure to be accommodating to
diversity initiatives, may also be hesitant to label a minority supervisor or coworker's conduct as racially
motivated. However, since 26% of the defendants are minorities, this does not seem to be widely true.
166. Men constitute only about half of the labor force. Whites are 70% of the labor force, Blacks
about 12%, and Asians about 4%. So, while almost 3/4 of accused harassers are White, Blacks and

Asians are defendants at a 50% or higher rate than you would expect given their representation in the
labor force.
167. However, only 3.5% of the cases are minority-on-minority harassment. This might mean that
minorities are disinclined to harass each other. Or perhaps there are intra-group pressures to maintain a
solidarity that discourage minority employees from accusing their minority supervisors and minority

coworkers of misconduct.
168. In all of these eight cases, the plaintiffs are Black; in five of the cases, there are multiple
harassers of mixed racial backgrounds including Blacks. In the ninth case (in which the plaintiff won in
part and the defendant won in part), both the plaintiff and the defendant are Asian.
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In contrast, the defendants' gender does not seem to affect outcome.
Plaintiffs who accuse women of harassing them are as likely to win or lose
as plaintiffs who accuse men. Thus, the study indicates that judges are
comparably critical of women harassers and men harassers.
10. Racial Harassment May Be a More Socially Accepted Activity Than
We Have Suspected-Judges Also Are More Likely To Disapprove of
"Ganging Up" on Victims (Tables 6, 13)
One of the most striking findings in the study is that it not unusual for
racial harassment to be a group activity involving both supervisors and
coworkers of the targeted employee. It often involves multiple individuals
at different organizational levels, suggesting a "ganging-up" on the targeted
individual. It appears that courts notice this "ganging up." Plaintiffs are
twice as likely to win when there are multiple harassers rather than an
individual harasser and twice as likely to win when both the supervisor and
coworkers are engaged in the harassment. These circumstances appear to
strengthen plaintiffs' showing that the harassment was "pervasive or
severe."
11. Plaintiffs Claim All Kinds of Harassment-However,Judges Do Not
Seem Persuaded That More Subtle and Covert Forms of Harassment Can
Constitute "Severe or Pervasive" Harassment (Tables 8, 14)
Contrary to societal perceptions, blatant racist harassment apparently
continues in the workplace. Plaintiffs also claim more subtle and covert
harassment that is not on its face race-linked (such as supervisors' workrelated decisions), but which the plaintiffs perceive as racially motivated
because of the context in which it occurs.
While the existence of both blatant racism and subtle racism has been
recognized by social scientists, a number of legal scholars argue that the
courts do not recognize more subtle discrimination.169 This study supports
this contention: judges are slightly more likely to recognize blatant racial
prejudice than more contextual or subtle racial prejudice. In perusing the
plaintiffs' presentation of facts and particularly when evaluating whether
the harassment is "because of race," judges tend to deem relevant only
those allegations of harassment that are overtly race-linked. Thus, judges
make reference to racial epithets such as "nigger" and to "noose" incidents,
but tend not to find relevant plaintiffs' allegations of their exclusion from
professional or work-related activities; social isolation; or hostile, rude, and
demeaning comments that do not expressly include a racial epithet. Most
169.

See supra note 38.
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judges do not know, do not find applicable, or do not find persuasive the
relevant social science research on subtle and contextual racial harassment.
Plaintiffs, however, should not be overly confident about claims based
on physical and ostensibly racist harassment. Success rates are relative.
These plaintiffs are still likely to lose in two out of every three cases. It is
just that plaintiffs without these types of overtly egregious racial
harassment claims are worse off.
12. The Forum of the Litigation Makes a Difference (Tables 9, 15 and
Figure 1)
Given their volume of cases, some circuits and states play a more
dominant role in shaping racial harassment jurisprudence. Over half of the
cases occurred in either the Seventh or the Second Circuits. Illinois and
New York are the most fertile ground for cases. It is not clear why these
patterns exist. Population size does not fully explain. California and Texas
are the states with the largest populations, 7 ' but less than 10% of the cases
originate in each of these states. Illinois and New York, the states with the
fifth and third largest populations respectively,'71
have the highest
percentage of cases with almost a quarter of all cases originating in Illinois.
Perhaps there are more racial harassment occurrences or racial harassment
complaints in these locations (thus the input into the dispute resolution
process funnel depicted in Figure 1 is greater); or perhaps more plaintiffs
move through the dispute resolution process (thus there is less attrition
between the first stage and the last stage of the process). It may also be that
in these locations, lawyers are more inclined to take these cases and judges
are more inclined to hear and ultimately write opinions on these cases.
It is clear, however, that the location of the case makes a difference in
outcome. The plaintiffs' success rates vary considerably depending on the
circuit in which the case occurs (between 12.8% and 55.5%) and the state in
which the case originates (between 8.6% to 29.4%). Assuming that courts
are confronted with comparable fact patterns, these variations suggest that
legal standards are not uniform throughout the United States. Courts in one
circuit may find a particular plaintiffs claims of racial harassment
persuasive while courts in another circuit may not. Outcomes across states
vary considerably, although stereotyping of states is not appropriate. Given
California's image as a pro-employee and ethnically diverse state which
uses the reasonableness perspective of the plaintiff, one would not have
predicted that it would have the worst plaintiffs' success rate. Similarly,
given the Southern states' image as more pro-employer and less socially

170.

CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 64, at 23 tbl. 19.

171.

Id.
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progressive, one would not have predicted than Alabama would have the
best plaintiffs' success rate. On the other hand, other states in the Deep
South, such as Georgia and Louisiana, did have lower plaintiffs' success
rates. 172
Plaintiffs have significantly higher success rates in smaller, less
ethnically diverse states than in larger, more ethnically diverse states.
Perhaps racial harassment complaints (and other racial discrimination
claims) have become more commonplace in the larger diverse states and
judges there have become more cynical and skeptical of them. At the same
time, racial harassment complaints (and other racial discrimination claims)
may be more novel and therefore noteworthy in smaller less diverse states.
Given their novelty, judges there may be more attentive to and
consequently more sympathetic toward the complainants. Likewise, judges
in these states may be more vigilant to protect the state's image from being
branded biased or racist.
13. Claims Based on Post-Civil War Statutes Sections 1981 and 1983 Are
Surprisingly Numerous and Successful (Tables 11, 17)
As the premier federal statute for addressing racial discrimination in
the workplace, it is not surprising that almost 90% of the plaintiffs utilize
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It is striking, however, that over a
third of the plaintiffs also base their racial harassment claim on Section
1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Plaintiffs' lawyers must see
beneficial attributes of Section 1981 claims. The effect of the statutory
claims on outcomes proves that this attraction to Sections 1981 and 1983 is
justified. Plaintiffs who included these post-Civil War causes of action had
significantly better odds of winning. While the number of Title VII cases
brought increased in number in recent years, the plaintiffs' win rates
became worse.' 7 3 Meanwhile, Section 1981 and 1983 cases increased more
74
modestly, but their plaintiffs' win rates remained steady. 1

172.

These comparisons are still relative. Even in Alabama, defendants win over 70% of the cases.

173.

The growth in racial harassment litigation since the mid-1990s is largely attributable to Title

VII cases. Since 1987, the number of cases based on Section 1981 or Section 1983 has been small and
steady. The exceptional year is 2002 in which there were a record number of these cases. Even in that

year, however, Title VII cases easily dwarfed Section 1981 and Section 1983 cases.
174. Between 1992 and 2002, plaintiffs in Title VII cases won on average 20.8% of the time, in
contrast to plaintiffs in Section 1981 and 1983 cases who won on average 32.5% of the time.
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14. Many Racial Harassment Claims Are Coupled with Racial
Discriminationand Retaliation Claims, Suggesting Plaintiffs'Perceptionof
PervasiveDiscrimination (Tables 11, 17)
This data suggests that plaintiffs perceive that hostile work
environments, more tangible formal employer decisions, and employer
retaliation occur hand-in-hand, and are racially motivated and
Plaintiffs portray a very debilitating work situation.
discriminatory.
Furthermore, plaintiffs who bring a concurrent racial discrimination claim
have a significantly lower success rate in their racial harassment case.
Perhaps judges believe that the plaintiffs are overexaggerating their
situation. Another possibility is that judges want to discourage plaintiffs
from multiple race-based complaints, and choose to deny the lessrecognized harassment claim.
In contrast to the plaintiffs' coupling of racial harassment with racial
discrimination or retaliation claims, a relatively small percentage of the
cases included a concurrent sexual harassment claim. This could be
because more than a majority of the plaintiffs are male and therefore less
likely to bring sexual harassment claims. It could also be that individuals
who harass an individual on the basis of their race are not motivated to
harass them on the basis of their sex. Finally, it may be that some women
plaintiffs, who are racially and sexually targeted, fold their racial
harassment claims into their sexual harassment causes of action.
15. The Federal Reporter Cases and Non-Federal Reporter Cases Paint
Different Pictures of Racial Harassment Litigation (Tables 10, 16)
Over 60% of the cases are not published in the Federal Reporter. Thus,
a substantial portion of judicial reasoning and interpretation in racial
harassment cases does not have the accessibility or the credibility of
publication in the Federal Reporter. Moreover, judges, lawyers, and
scholars relying only on the Federal Reporter receive a distorted view of
racial harassment law, which indicates the plaintiffs' probability of winning
a lawsuit are higher than they are when you consider all cases. On the other
hand, the higher plaintiffs' win rate in the Federal Reporter offers more
positive (albeit unrepresentative) precedents for plaintiffs' use as authority.
B.

The Future of Racial HarassmentLaw

Racial harassment law deserves its own jurisprudence. Although it
launched workplace harassment doctrine through the Rogers case, the tide
of legal events moved in the direction of sexual harassment. For too long,
racial harassment jurisprudence has lived in the backwaters of sexual
harassment law. It has remained off the roadmap of legal scholars.
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Consequently judges have shaped it haphazardly in different parts of the
country.
This study alters that legal geography.
It provides the first
representative summary of what actually occurs with racial harassment
cases in the courts. It gives scholars a sound basis to create a new
jurisprudence guided by statistically sound data. By pointing the way to the
particular case characteristics that affect actual outcomes, this study can
help scholars in their efforts to develop "theories" of racial harassment.
The study benefits plaintiffs, defendants, their lawyers, and judges
involved in racial harassment cases. All parties can compare their cases to
its detailed baseline. In addition to the traditional selective case precedent
method, parties can now draw upon the totality of racial harassment cases to
guide their decision-making. Knowing the odds of winning or losing with
particular claims, parties, or fora can help determine whether or not to use
the courts. Lawyers who tend to see "harassment law" through the lens of
sexual harassment now can explore racial harassment as a distinct avenue.
Judges in particular can benefit by examining their own decisionmaking
against the collective judicial decisionmaking across the country. We hope
this study will encourage them to reflect on their own views and potential
blind spots when it comes to racial harassment.
Finally, legislators can use this study to guide their own efforts to end
racial harassment in the workplace. They can see how legislation has
played out in the courts and decide whether their efforts are having the
intended consequences. Knowing the results of prior efforts enables them
to craft future laws to better achieve their desired end. This study provides
a benchmark against which they can measure their progress, monitor the
judicial branch's rendering of their laws, and modify ongoing efforts in
response to racial harassment cases.

